BRUCE HILLS AND JUDITH HELLS Individually, and as natural parents and heirs of MARK D. HILLS, v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC, an Ohio Corporation; UPSCO UNITED PARCEL SERVICE CO, a Delaware Corporation; UNITED PARCEL SERVICE INC., a Utah Corporation; LIBERTY MUTUAL HOLDING COMPANY, INC, a Massachusetts Mutual Holding Company; LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, a Massachusetts Mutual Holding Company; and SKYLINE ELECTRIC COMPANY, a Utah Corporatio : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2008
BRUCE HILLS AND JUDITH HELLS
Individually, and as natural parents and heirs of
MARK D. HILLS, v. UNITED PARCEL
SERVICE, INC, an Ohio Corporation; UPSCO
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE CO, a Delaware
Corporation; UNITED PARCEL SERVICE INC.,
a Utah Corporation; LIBERTY MUTUAL
HOLDING COMPANY, INC, a Massachusetts
Mutual Holding Company; LIBERTY MUTUAL
FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, a Massachusetts
Mutual Holding Company; and SKYLINE
ELECTRIC COMPANY, a Utah Corporatio :
Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Michael E. Dyer, Kira M. Slawson; Blackburn & Stoll, PC; Taggart Hansen; Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher LLP; Attorneys for Appellee.
Edward P. Moriarity, Bradley L. Booke; Moriarity, Badaruddin & Booke, LLC; Attorneys for
Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Hills v. United Parcel Service, No. 20080826 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2008).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1200
IN THE SUPREME COURT APPELATE CASE 
STATE OF UTAH NO. 20080826 
BRUCE HILLS AND JUDITH HELLS 
Individually, and as natural parents Plamtifls/Appellants, 
and heirs of MARK D. HILLS, 
vs. 
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC, an Ohio Corporation; UPSCO UNITED PARCEL 
SERVICE CO, a Delaware Corporation; UNITED PARCEL SERVICE INC., a Utah Corporation; 
LIBERTY MUTUAL HOLDING COMPANY, INC, a Massachusetts Mutual Holding Company; 
LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, a Massachusetts Mutual Holding 
Company; and SKYLINE ELECTRIC COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ON APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
HONORABLE TERRY L. CHRISTIANSEN 
MICHAEL E.DYER 
KIRAM. SLAWSON 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, PC 
257 East 200 South, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
TAGGART HANSEN (pro hac vice) 
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP 
1801 California Street, Suite 4200 
Denver, CO 80202 
Attorneys for Appellee UPS Inc., et al. 
EDWARD P. MORIARnY (Bar No. 5622) 
BRADLEY L. BOOKE (Bar No. 9984) 
MORIARITY BADARUDDIN 
& BOOKE, LLC 
8 East Broadway, Suite 312 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: 406 326 8090 
Facsimile: 406 521 0546 
Attorneys for Appellant 
UTAH APPELLATE C 
MAR 2 0 2009 
DENNIS R. JAMES 
SARA N.BECKER 
MORGAN, MNNOCK, RICE & JAMES LC 
136 South Main, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Attorneys for Appellee Skyline Electric Company 
GARY L.JOHNSON 
MARTHA KNUDSON 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Wells Fargo Center 
299 South Main, 15th Floor 
PO Box 2465 
Salt lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Appellee Liberty Mutual Holding Company Inc., et al 
IN THE SUPREME COURT APPELATE CASE 
STATE OF UTAH NO. 20080826 
BRUCE HILLS AND JUDITH HILLS 
Individually, and as natural parents 'laintiffe/Appellants, 
and heirs of MARK D. HILLS, 
vs. 
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE., INC., an Ohio Corporation; UPSCO UNITED PARCEL 
SERVICE CO., a Delaware Corporation; UNITED PARCEL SERVICE INC., a Utah Corporation; 
LIBERTY MUTUAL HOLDING COMPANY, INC., a Massachusetts Mutual Holding Company; 
LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, a Massachusetts Mutual Holding 
Company; and SKYLINE ELECTRIC COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ON APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
HONORABLE TERRY L. CHRISTIANSEN 
MICHAEL E.DYER 
KIRAM.SLAWSON 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, PC 
257 East 200 South, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
EDWARD P. MORIARITY (Bar No. 5622) 
BRADLEY L. BOOKE (Bar No. 9984) 
MORIARrrY, BADARUDDIN 
& BOOKE, LLC 
8 East Broadway, Suite 312 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: 406326 8090 
Facsimile: 406 521 0546 
TAGGART HANSEN (pro hac vice) 
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHERLLP 
1801 California Street, Suite 4200 
Denver, CO 80202 
Attorneys for Appellee UPS Inc., et al. Attorneys for Appellant 
DENNIS R. JAMES 
SARA N.BECKER 
MORGAN, MINNOCK, RICE & JAMES LC 
136 South Main, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Attorneys for Appellee Skyline Electric Company 
GARY L.JOHNSON 
MARTHA KNUDSON 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Wells Fargo Center 
299 South Main, 15th Floor 
PO Box 2465 
Salt lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Appellee Liberty Mutual Holding Company Inc., et al. 
COMPLETE LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(1), Appellant states that following are a complete list of the parties 
to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is sought to be reviewed: 
a. Plaintiff/Appellant: Bruce Hills 
b. PlaMfflAppellant: Judith Hills 
c. Defendant/Appellee: United Parcel Service, Inc. et al. 
& Defendant/Appellee: Skyline Electric Company 
e. Defendant/Appellee: Liberty Mutual Holding Company Inc., et al. 
i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF ALL PARTIES i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES v 
I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
ISSUE #1 1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
CITATION TO RECORD 2 
ISSUE #2 2 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 2 
CITATION TO THE RECORD 2 
ISSUE #3 2 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 3 
CITATION TO RECORD 3 
ISSUE #4 3 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 3 
CITATION TO RECORD 4 
ISSUE #5 4 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 4 
CITATION TO RECORD 4 
ii 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 5 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 5 
NATURE OF THE CASE 5 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 5 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 8 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 12 
ARGUMENT 13 
A. APPELLANTS CLAIMS, AS CONSTRUED, ARE RECOGNIZABLE CAUSES OF 
ACTION FOR NEGLIGENT AND INTENTIONAL SPOLIATION 14 
1. SYNOPSIS OF SPOLIATION 15 
a. SPOLIATION's FOUNDATION: INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS '...15 
b. SPOLIATION'S ELEMENTS 17 
c. RECOGNIZING FIRST OR THIRD PARTY SPOLIATION 18 
d. RIPENESS 19 
e. CALCULATING SPOLIATION DAMAGES 20 
f. SPOLIATION' s DAMAGES ARE OUTSIDE WORKERS 
COMPENSATION COVERAGE FORMULA 20 
2. APPLICATION: APPELLANTS' CLAIMS CONSTITUTE SPOLIATION 
AND SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED 23 
3. APPELLANTS' STATED CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY THE WORKERS 
COMPENSATION EXCLUSIVITY PROVISION AS THE DUAL CAPACITY 
DOCTRINE APPLIES 28 
1. DUAL CAPACITY DOCTRINE 28 
iii 
2. APPLICATION: THE DUAL CAPACITY DOCTRINE PRECLUDES 
WORKERS COMPENSATION EXCLUSIVITY 31 
C. APPELLANTS' STATED CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY WORKERS 
COMPENSATION EXCLUSIVITY AS APPELLEES' ACTS WERE 
INTENTIONAL 32 
1. WORKERS COMPENSATION DOES NOT BAR INTENTIONAL ACTS 32 
2. APPELLEES UPS AND LIBERTY MUTUAL'S HARMS WERE 
INTENTIONAL 33 
D. APPELLEE LIBERTY MUTUAL SHOULD HAVE NOT BEEN DISMISSED WITH 
PREJUDICE. AS A NON-EMPLOYER THE WORKERS COMPENSATION 
EXCLUSIVITY BAR WAS INAPPLICABLE TO LIBERTY MUTUAL AND THIRD 
PARTY INSURERS HAVE BEEN HELD LIABLEFOR SPOLIATION 34 
E. APPELLEES PRAYER FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES SHOULD BE REINSTATED AS 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES HAVE BEEN HELD A VIABLE DETERRENT IN CASES OF 
fisfTENnoNAL SPOLIATION 37 
VIL CONCLUSION 40 
ADDENDUM Addendum Tab 
Exhibit 1: Minute Entry and Order (Motion to Consolidate Cases for Discovery, 
February 15,2007. 
Exhibit 2: Ruling and Order Staying Pending Motions to Dismiss, May 4,2007. 
Exhibit 3: The Order Re: Defendants Renewed Motion to Dismiss Based On 
Mootness, June 12,2008. 
Exhibit 4: Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Defendant's Renewed Motion to 
Dismiss, September 9,2008. 
Exhibit 5: Supreme Court Order of Retention, October 31,2008. 
iv 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Anderson Development Co., L.C v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, \ 67, 
116 P.3d 323, 341 (Utah 2005) 2, 3, 4, 14 
Bethea v. Modern Biomedical Services, Inc., 704 So.2d 1227 
(La. Ct. App., 1997) 16, 18, 26, 31 
Bigelowv. R.K.O. Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264-65 (1946) 20 
Bingham v. Lagoon Corp., 707 P.2d 678, 679-80 (Utah 1985) 13, 29, 30, 31 
Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415, 419 
(UT App. 1994) 14,27 
Bryan v. Utah Ml, 533 P.2d 892 (Utah 1975) 32 
Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2001 UT 89, 65 P.3d 1134 38,40 
Carter v. Exide Corporation, 661 So.2d 698 (La.App. 2 Cir., 1995) 22 
Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior Court, 233 Cal. App.3d 1273, 
286 Cal.Rptr. 855 (1991) 21, 30, 31 
Coleman v. Eddy Potash, 905 P.2d 185(NM., 1985) 16, 17, 18, 22, 32, 33, 34 
Diversified Holdings, L.C. v. Turner, 2002 UT 129, f 17, 
63 P.3d 686, 695-696 39, 40 
Foster v. Lawrence Memorial Hospital, 809 F.Supp. 831, 838 (D. Kasas, 1992)... 19, 28 
Gambrellv. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, 562 S.W.2d 163, 168 
(Mo.Ct.App.1978) 23 
Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456, 464 (Ak., 1986) 15, 16, 19 
Hannah v. Heeter, 584 S.E.2d 560 (W.Va., 2003) 16, 17, 18, 19, 27, 35, 36, 39 
Helfv. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., - P.3d--, 2009 WL 348763 (Utah), 2009 UT 11 13, 32 
Holmes v. Amerex Rent-A-Car, 710 A.2d 846, 851 (D.C, 1998) 15, 17, 18, 20 
V 
Hunsakerv. State, 870 P.2d 893 (Utah 1993) 29 
Koplinv. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 241 Kan. 206 (1987) 16, 19 
Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 301 
(Utah 1982) 14, 16, 24 
Lincoln Insurance Company v. Home Emergency Services, Inc., 812 So.2d 433, 
(Fl. Ct. App., 2002) 20, 21 
Miller v. Allstate Insurance Company, 573 So.2d 24, (Fl. D. Ct. App., 1990).. 15, 35, 36 
Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Company, 
823 P.2d 1055, 1056 (Utah 1991) 13, 22, 23, 25 
Norris v. Colony Ins. Co., 760 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA, 2000) 21 
Oliver v. Stimson Lumber Co., 993 P.2d 11, 18 (Mont., 1999) 15, 16, 17, 18, 22 
Pirocchiv. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 365 F.Supp 277 (E.D. Pa., 1973) 21 
Shattuck-Owen v. Snowbird Corp., 2000 UT 94,^ 19, 16 P.3d 555, 560 22, 25 
Smith v. Atkinson, 711 So.2d 429 (Ala., 2000) 16, 18, 35, 36, 39 
Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc. 82 P.3d 1064, 1017 (Utah,2003) 38 
Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., 615 N.E.2d 1037 (Oh.,1993).... 16, 17, 18, 19, 24, 25, 28 
Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal.R 829, 831 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) 15, 19 
St. Benedict's Development Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 
811 P.2d at 194 (Utah 1991) 1, 2, 3, 4 
Stewart v. CMICorp., 740 P.2d 1340, 1341 (Utah 1987) 29 
Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 
(1931) 20 
Thompson v. Owensby, 704N.E.2d 134 (In.Ct.App., 1998) 16, 18, 20, 26, 35. 36, 37 
Townsendv. Conshor, Inc., 832 So.2d 166 (Fl. Ct. App.,2002), 16, 18 
vi 
Waddoups v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 2002 UT 69, 54 P.3d 1054, 
1056 (Utah 2002) 14 
Worthen v. Kennecott Corporation, 780 F.2d 856 (10th Cir.,1985) 30, 31 
Statutes 
Louisiana Civil Code., Article 2315 18 
Utah Administrative Code, R614-1-1-5.C.6 10,26, 33 
Workers'Compensation Act, 
Utah Code Annotated §§ 34A-2-101 et seq 12 
Utah Code Annotated §§34A-2-105(l) (1999) 5,23,28,29,34 
Utah Code Annotated §§34A-6-110 '. 26 
Utah Code Ann., §35-1-60 (1953) 23 
Utah Code Ann., §35-A-3-105 23 
Utah Code Ann., § 78A-3-102-(3)(j)(2008) 1 
Utah Code Ann., § 78B-8-201(l)(a)(1953) 5, 37, 38, 40 
Rules 
Utah. R. App. P. 24(a)(4), 1 
Utah R App. P. 24(a)(5) 1 
Utah R App. P. 24(a)(6) 5 
Utah R App. P. 24(a)(7), 5 
Utah R App. P. 24(a)(8), 12 
Utah R App. P. 24(a)(9), 13 
Utah. R Civ. P. 12(b)(6), 1,2,3,4,5,12 
vii 
L STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Pursuant to Utah. R. App. P. 24(a)(4), Appellants states as follows: The Supreme Court of 
Utah has appellate jurisdiction over orders Judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which 
the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. Utah Code 78A-3-
102(3)0(2008). This Supreme Court elected to review and retain jurisdiction of this case by 
vacating transfer to the Court of Appeals on October 10,2008. (Record on Appeal (hereinafter "R.") 
1254-1255). 
DL STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5), Appellants states the issues presented for review, the 
standard for review, and demonstrates that each issue was preserved below. 
ISSUE NO. 1: Did the trial court err in dismissing Plaintiffs' claims against Appellees 
UPS, Inc. et al. (hereinafter "UPS"); and Mutual Liberty Holding Company Inc. et al. 
(hereinafter "Liberty Mutual"),1 pursuant to Utah. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), by finding that 
Plaintiffs did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted, because such claim 
was based upon the presently unacknowledged tort of spoliation? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Correctness. The propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal 
is a question of law and the district court's ruling is entitled to no deference and the 
decision is reviewed under a correctness standard. St. Benedict's Development Co. v. St. 
1
 Appellants concede a first party spoliation claim against Appellee Skyline Electric 
Company (hereinafter "Skyline") is now moot. Skyline pled facts in their Answer and 
Counterclaim alleging no involvement with evidence destruction, and furthermore 
counter claimed against Appellee UPS for spoliation (R. at 159 - 193), as well as recently 
admitting liability in the underlying suit (R. at 1084 - 1088). 
1 
Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991); Anderson Development Co., L.C. v. 
Tobias, 2005 UT 36, t 67, 116 P.3d 323, 341 (Utah 2005). 
CITATION TO RECORD: Appellants preserved this issue by raising and arguing same in their 
Response and Opposition to Defendant United Parcel Service Inc.; Defendant Skyline Electric; and 
Defendant Liberty Mutual's Supplemental Briefs In Support of Renewed Motion to Dismiss (R 
1142-1171). 
ISSUE NO. 2: Did the trial court err in dismissing Plaintiffs' claims against Appellee 
UPS, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), by finding that Plaintiffs did not state a claim 
upon which relief could have been granted, because such a claim was barred by the 
exclusive remedy provision of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act as the dual capacity 
doctrine has not been adopted in Utah? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Correctness. The propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal 
is a question of law and the district court's ruling is entitled to no deference and the 
decision is reviewed under a correctness standard. St. Benedict's Development Co., 811 
P.2d at 194, 196 (Utah 1991); Anderson Development Co., L.C. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36,1 
67, 116 P.3d 323, 341 (Utah 2005). 
CITATION TO RECORD: Appellants preserved this issue by raising and arguing same in their 
Response and Opposition to Defendant United Parcel Service Inc.; Delendant Skyline Electric; and 
Defendant Liberty MutuaTs Supplemental Briefs In Support of Renewed Motion to Dismiss (R 
1142-1171). 
ISSUE NO. 3: Did the trial court err in dismissing Plaintiffs' claims against Appellee 
UPS, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), by finding that Plaintiffs did not state a claim 
2 
upon which relief could have been granted, because such a claim was barred by the 
exclusive remedy provision of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act as Appellee UPS's 
acts were not intentional? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Correctness. The propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal 
is a question of law and the district court's ruling is entitled to no deference and the 
decision is reviewed under a correctness standard. St Benedict's Development Co. ,811 
P.2d at 194, 196 (Utah 1991); Anderson Development Co., L.C v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, % 
67, 116 P.3d 323, 341 (Utah 2005). 
CITATION TO RECORD: Appellants preserved this issue by raising and arguing same in their 
Response and Opposition to Defendant United Parcel Service Inc.; Defendant Skyline Electric; and 
Defendant Liberty Mutual's Supplemental Briefs In Support of Renewed Motion to Dismiss (R. 
1142-1171). 
ISSUE NO. 4: Did the trial court err in dismissing Plaintiffs' claims against Appellee 
Liberty Mutual, pursuant to Utah. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), by dismissing this Appellee with 
prejudice despite the inapplicability of the exclusivity provision of the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act to this non-employer Appellee and the applicability of spoliation 
claims against this Appellee should this Court recognize spoliation? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Correctness. The propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal 
is a question of law and the district court's ruling is entitled to no deference and the 
decision is reviewed under a correctness standard. St. Benedict's Development Co., 811 
P.2d at 194, 196 (Utah 1991); Anderson Development Co., L.C v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, f 
67, 116 P.3d 323, 341 (Utah 2005). 
3 
CITATION TO RECORD: Appellants preserved this issue by raising and arguing same in their 
Response and Opposition to Defendant United Parcel Service Inc.; Defendant Skyline Electric; and 
Defendant Liberty Mutual's Supplemental Briefs In Support of Renewed Motion to Dismiss (R 
1142-1171). 
ISSUE NO. 5: Did the trial court err in dismissing Plaintiffs' claims against Appellees 
UPS and Liberty Mutual, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), for punitive damages in a 
cause of action asserting spoliation? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Correctness. The propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal 
is a question of law and the district court's ruling is entitled to no deference and the 
decision is reviewed under a correctness standard. St. Benedict's Development Co., 811 
P.2d at 194, 196 (Utah 1991); Anderson Development Co., L.C v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, \ 
67, 116 P.3d 323, 341 (Utah 2005). 
CITATION TO RECORD: Appellants preserved this issue by raising and arguing same in their 
Response and Opposition to Defendant United Parcel Service Inc.; Defendant Skyline Electric; and 
Defendant Liberty Mutual's Supplemental Briefs In Support of Renewed Motion to Dismiss (R 
1142-1171). 
4 
m. DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES. 
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(6), Appellants identifies the following rules and statutes 
whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal. 
UtahR. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 
Workers' Compensation Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34A-2-105 (1999). 
Utah Code Ann., § 78B-8-201(l)(a)(1953). 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(7), Appellants states as follows: 
NATURE OF THE CASE: Appellants, Bruce Hills and Judith Hills, (hereinafter the '"Hills") 
brought an action for negligent and intentional spoliation of evidence and tortious interference against 
(1) the former employer of their deceased son, Appellee UPS; (2) an electrical contractor who 
performed services at UPS's facility, Appellee Skyline; and (3) UPS's Workers Compensation 
Insurer, Appellee Liberty Mutual (R. 1 - 27). Appellants alleged negligent as well as knowing, 
intentional, and willful harms committed against themselves by all Appellees. (R. 1 - 27). 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW: The Appellants initially 
brought a wrongful death lawsuit against Appellee Skyline for the electrocution death of their son, 
Mark Hills, by filing a complaint on October 15, 2004 in a separate case still pending before the 
Hiird Judicial District Court, Hills v. Skyline Electric Co., Civil No. 040107125 (hereinafter "Hills 
I"). (R. 613 - 718). On August 16, 2005, Appellant filed the pertinent Complaint and 
Demand for Jury Trial relative to this appeal (hereinafter "Hills IF'). (R. 1 - 27). In 
response, on November 7, 2005, Appellee UPS filed a Motion to Dismiss. (R. 53 - 55). 
Appellee Liberty Mutual filed its Motion to Dismiss on November 10, 2005. (R. 89-91) . 
5 
Appellant filed an opposition to Appellee UPS's motion to dismiss on November 28, 
2005, (R. 102 - 113), and an opposition to Appellee Liberty's motion to dismiss on 
November 29, 2005. (R. 114 - 131). On January 13, 2006, Appellee Skyline filed an 
Answer to Appellant's Complaint and Cross Claim Against Appellee UPS and Notice of 
Intent to Apportion Fault Against UPS. (R. 159 - 193). UPS filed a Motion to Dismiss 
Skyline's cross claims for spoliation on February 6, 2006, (R. at 202 - 203), to which 
Appellee Skyline filed an opposition. (R. at 235- 242). 
On April 25, 2006, the Court, the Hon. Royal I. Hansen presiding, heard oral 
arguments and issued an Order that Appellees UPS and Liberty "respond to the discovery 
in this matter" and disposition of the motion to dismiss would be revisited upon 
completion of Hills L (R. 268 - 279). A joint request for clarification of the April 26, 
2006 Order was filed by all parties on August 18, 2006. (R. 260 - 264). Statements 
regarding clarification were filed by all parties on September 29, 2006: Appellee Skyline 
(R. 268 - 279); Appellants Hills (R. 268 - 279); and Appellees UPS and Liberty (R. 380 
- 454). On November 14, 2006, the Court, the Hon. Royal I. Hansen presiding, issued an 
Order on Request for Clarification stating, (1) any party could seek a motion to 
consolidate in either Hills I or Hills II and (2) supplemental briefs could be filled on the 
Hills II motion to dismiss. (PL. 464 - 468). Supplemental briefs were filed by Appellee 
Liberty Mutual in support on December 13, 2006 (R. 469 - 475); Appellee UPS in 
support on December 15, 2006 (R. 483 - 490); and a joint opposition by Appellants Hills 
and Appellee Skyline on December 15, 2006. (R. 476 - 482). 
6 
On February 15, 2007, the Court, Hon. Stephen L. Roth presiding in Hills II, 
ordered the consolidation for discovery purposes only of Hills I and Hills II. (R. 613 -
718). Then, on May 7, 2007, the Court issued a Ruling and Order Staying Pending 
Motions to Dismiss Until Resolution of Hills J, (R. 595 - 598). This May 7, 2009 order, 
the Hon. Terry L. Christiansen presiding, designated that Hills II should be stayed 
pending resolution of Hills /, thereby setting aside both Appellee UPS and Appellee 
Liberty Mutual's original Motions to Dismiss. (R. 595 - 598). 
On December 28, 2008, Appellee Skyline amended its answer in the original Hills 
I lawsuit, admitting liability but denying any damages as the result of the electrocution 
death of Appellants' son mark Hills. (R. at 1084 - 1088). Appellee UPS filed a renewed 
motion to dismiss on January 3, 2008, (R. 719—721) which Appellee Liberty Mutual 
joined on January 14, 2008. (R. 722 - 724). Appellants opposed Appellees' motion by 
filing an opposition on January 24, 2008. On March 31, 2008, oral arguments were heard 
before the Court. Supplemental briefs on the renewed motion to dismiss were filed by 
the Appellees on May 1, 2008: Appellee UPS (R. 793 - 1088) and Appellee Liberty 
Mutual (R. 1090 - 1101; 1102 - 1111; and 1112 - 1123). Appellants filed their response 
and opposition on June 2, 2008. (R. 1142 - 1171). On June 12, 2008, the Court, the 
Hon. Terry Christiansen presiding, ordered (a) Appellee Skyline's cross-claims asserted 
against Appellee UPS in Hills II dismissed with prejudice, (b) dismissal of all negligence 
claims in Hills II by the Appellant against all Appellees with prejudice, and (c) dismissal 
of all damage claims relative to Appellants' intentional misconduct and tortious 
7 
interference causes of action, excluding punitive damages and damages for tortious 
interference and hindrance with a legal cause of action. 
Following this initial partial dismissal, Appellees UPS and Liberty Mutual 
requested that further oral argument be heard on the renewed motion to dismiss. UPS 
filed its request on June 13, 2008 (R. 1181 - 1183) and Liberty Mutual filed its request 
on June 16, 2008 (R. 1192 - 1195). Oral argument was heard before the Court, Hon. 
Terry L. Christiansen presiding, on September 9, 2008. The Court issued its 
Memorandum Decision and Order on September 9, 2008, dismissing with prejudice all 
remaining causes of action - intentional misconduct and tortious interference, as well as 
the remaining damage claims for interference and hindrance with a legal cause of action. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS: Appellants, Bruce and Judith Hills, are the parents of 
Mark Hills. Mark was a package handler at Appellee UPS's Parkway Boulevard 
distribution center in Salt Lake City. On Tuesday, August 19, 2003, at approximately 
4:20 A.M. Mark was electrocuted to death when he reached down to pick up a package 
that had fallen off a conveyor belt that fed items into a distribution trailer that abutted the 
facility. (R. at 5-6, fflf 14 - 25). Appellee Skyline, whom routinely performed electrical 
work at the facility, had recently conducted work on August 15, 2003 to light fixtures in 
this adjacent trailer. Due to improper reinstallation, work the lights were not grounded 
and consequently the trailer was "hot". (R. at 6-7, fflf 27 - 31). Mark had unwittingly 
completed the continuity between the trailer and ground as he reached for the package. 
(R. at 6,124). 
8 
UPS took control of the electrocution scene immediately after Mark Hills' death 
and determined to mount their own investigation before reporting the fatal accident to 
OSHA. This action directly contradicted protocols that the scene be secured and an 
investigation performed by OSHA as required by Utah law. (R. at 180-181, ffif 10, 12). 
Staff from Appellee Skyline were summoned (approximately 6:15 A.M.; per OSHA's 
January 26, 2004 accident report) to the electrocution scene by Appellee UPS. The 
Skyline staff were allowed on scene only under the explicit direction of Appellee UPS. 
(R. at 182, | 17). Appellee Liberty Mutual, "the country's leading accident investigator," 
sanctioned this immediate and unlawful investigation of the electrocution scene. (R. at 
239, f 5); hired an electrical contractor, Heath Engineering, to investigate and ultimately 
alter and destroy evidence at the scene (R. at 923, f 2); and, as alleged in Appellants' 
Complaint, Appellee Liberty Mutual was also present during such investigations. (R. at 
7,134). 
Appellee UPS instructed personnel from Appellee Skyline to disassemble an 
electrical j-box which appeared to be the source of the problem. Appellee UPS retained 
various components from the j-box, but lost or destroyed a critical item - a wall anchor 
piece. (R. at 183, ffif 21 - 23). After Appellee Skyline was dismissed from the 
electrocution scene early that morning, Appellee UPS never consulted with Skyline again 
nor responded to Skyline's requests for information on the electrocution. (R. at 183 -
184, f 24). 
Following this initial self initiated investigation and evidence alteration and 
destruction, Appellee UPS contacted OSHA at approximately 9:02 A.M. on Tuesday, 
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August 19, 2003. (R. at 915, Tf 5). Around 10 A.M. police belatedly arrived, as the initial 
911 call had indicated a conventional cause of death - seizure. (R. at 914, | 3). The 
police officer could tell the scene had been altered. (R. at 914 - 915, f 4). An OSHA 
Compliance Officer arrived on scene at approximately 11 A.M. and identified that the 
scene had been altered and was unable to ascertain the cause of the electrocution as 
materials and equipment had been tampered with making duplication of conditions 
impossible. (R. at 915, 917; ^ 6, 15). The OSHA Compliance Officer instructed 
Appellee UPS's management to seal and isolate the electrocution scene from any contact 
or activity, until further authorization by the Compliance Officer. (R. at 915, | 7). 
Contrary to the Compliance Officer's order, after he left that morning, non-party 
Heath Engineering - initially contacted by; acting with the consent of; and contracted by 
Appellee Liberty Mutual - was brought on site by Appellee UPS the morning of January 
20, 2003, to perform additional investigation. (R. at 915, (l[f 8, at 923, f 2). This 
investigation further altered the scene with respect to the cause of the accident. (R. at 
915, % 8; at 11-12, | 48, 49, 50). OSHA's Compliance Officer, upon revisiting the site 
the afternoon of Tuesday, August 20, 2003, recognized the scene had been further altered 
and became aware third party vendors may have altered the scene - albeit Appellee UPS 
claimed no knowledge the scene had been altered nor mentioned the critical wall 
anchor's existence or disappearance. (R. at 916, ffl[ 9-11, 13). In the aftermath of the 
OSHA investigation, Appellee UPS was initially fined $70,000 for intentionally spoiling 
the scene of an accident pursuant to Utah Administrative Code R614-1-5.C.6. 
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Subsequent to this, a settlement was reached where the intentional violation was reduced 
to a negligence violation and the fine reduced to $6,000. (R. at 184, ^ f 26). 
Following the initial investigation of the electrocution, Appellee UPS in concert 
with its legal counsel, engaged in a protracted obfuscation with the Compliance Officer 
over access to the Heath Engineering report resulting from the unauthorized 
investigation. Access to the Heath Engineering employee who had conducted the 
investigation was also impeded. (R. at 917 - 119, ffif 17 - 26; at 921, FN 2). Appellee 
UPS parlayed this obstruction into the Hills I litigation claiming privileges and forcing 
Appellants to litigate with non-party Appellee UPS to obtain access to OSHA files as 
well as depose UPS's third party electrician who has altered the scene (R. at 910 - 927; at 
103, % 2). Appellee Skyline likewise recognized the harm and damages caused by 
Appellee UPS and Liberty Mutual's spoliation actions specific to Skyline's ability to 
defend itself in Hills 1. Consequently, Appellee Skyline counter claimed for negligent 
and tortious spoliation as well as intentional spoliation (R. at 184 - 189, fflf 27 - 48); 
opposed UPS's original motion to dismiss (R. at 219 - 230); and joined Appellants' 
opposition to UPS's original motion to dismiss (R. 476 - 482). 
Appellants were injured as a result of Appellees UPS and Liberty Mutual's 
negligent acts, intentional misconduct, and tortious interference. These original claims 
for relief - now deemed causes of action in spoliation - harmed Appellants by 
detrimentally impacting the economic expectancy Appellants had in Hills I litigation. (R. 
at 13 - 22, fflf 56 - 96; at 1143 - 1144; at 1150 - 1151). Appellees UPS and Liberty 
Mutual's actions increased Appellants' cost of suit and, more detrimentally, required the 
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initiation of Hills II out of necessity to preserve Appellants right to redress if no causation 
could be proven and damages recovered in Hills 1 (R. at 1150 - 1151). Furthermore, 
adjudication of Hills II continues and the impact upon probable expectancy has yet to be 
determined. To date, Appellee Skyline has only admitted liability in Hills I yet 
categorically denies any damages incurred by the fatal electrocution. (R. at 1143 -
1144). 
The Third Judicial District Court's Orders of June 12, 2008 (R. 1177-1180) and 
September 9, 2008 (R. 1224 - 1240) effectively ruled that Utah will not recognize the 
independent torts of negligent or intentional spoliation. Consequently, Appellee UPS's 
motion made pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) was granted,, The September 9, 2008, 
Order also reasoned that Appellee UPS's underlying actions were barred by the exclusive 
remedy provision of the Utah Workers Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-101 
et seq. - as neither these acts intentional character nor the contention these acts were 
outside the scope of the employer-employee relationship held merit, including the 
possibility the dual capacity doctrine might apply. 
V. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(8), Appellants state as follows: 
The district court erred when it granted the Appellees' Renewed Motion to Dismiss with 
prejudice as Appellants' allegations were sufficient to state causes of action for negligent or 
intentional spoliation as defined by jurisdictions presently recognizing these independent causes of 
action. Furthermore, among these jurisdictions, Florida; Louisiana; Montana; and New Mexico have 
held the workers compensation exclusivity bar inapplicable with respect to employer instigated 
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spoliation. And, contrary to the District Court's assessment, punitive damages have been deemed 
appropriate against third parties spoliators to thwart conduct similar to Appellees' malfeasance. 
Consistent with Utah law, Appellee UPS's acts of spoliation also qualify as an intentional 
injury exception to the Workers Compensation Act. An "intent to injure" occurred when Appellees 
UPS and Liberty Mutual - with knowledge of or the expectance of injury as a consequence -
engaged in spoliation. This knowledge of or expectancy of injury meets the criteria of the Act's 
intentional behaviors exception, as stated in this Court's recent ruling of Helfv. Chewon USA., Inc., 
_P3d _ 2009 WL 348763 (Utah), 2009 UT 11. 
Alternatively, Appellee UPS's acts are not within the exclusivity bar as the provisions for 
compensation in the Act relate to the diminution of loss of earning power caused by physical or 
mental injury or death and not damage to a probable expectancy derived from a lawsuit. Mounteer v. 
Utah Power & Light Company, 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah, 1991). In addition, the dual capacity doctrine 
also applies, and thereby precludes Appellee UPS's from Workers Compensation exclusivity. An 
unrelated obligation arose for UPS distinct from its obligations as decedent Mark Hills' employer. 
UPS was an evidence caretaker for an imminent lawsuit This non-employer obligation implicates 
the dual capacity doctrine as explained in Bingham v. Lagoon Corporation, 707 P.2d 678 (Utah, 
1985). 
VL ARGUMENT 
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9), Appellants state as follows: 
Accepting all of Appellants' allegations as admitted facts and drawing all 
inferences of those fact in the light favorable to Appellants, Appellants stated claims for 
relief against Appellees UPS and Liberty Mutual for negligent and intentional 
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misconduct, as well as tortious interference, have been sufficiently plead as either the 
independent torts of negligent or intentional spoliation, to survive Appellee UPS's motion 
to dismiss. Anderson Development Co., L.C v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, \ 53, quoting 
Waddoups v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 2002 UT 69, | 38, 54 P.3d 1054, 1065 (Utah 
2002)("In reviewing a district court's decision to grant a motion to dismiss . . . we accept 
the factual allegations in the [complaint] as true and consider them, and all reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party."). 
A. APPELLANTS CLAIMS, AS CONSTRUED, ARE RECOGNIZABLE CAUSES OF ACTION FOR 
NEGLIGENT AND INTENTIONAL SPOLIATION. 
On September 9, 2008, the Trial Court effectively dismissed with prejudice, all claims against 
Appellees. (R. at 1220 - 1240). The Trial Court's Memorandum Decision, supporting 
dismissal, denied acceptance of spoliation based on three premises. First, it was too "big 
a leap" for Utah jurisprudence, which recognizes the tort of intentional interference with 
economic relations, see Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 301 (Utah 
1982), to the analogous tort of spoliation despite other jurisdictions recognizing this 
logical step. (R. at 1229-1230; |^ 1). Second, it was too great a leap from a first party 
spoliation claim seeking redress via evidentiary inference, ELS discussed in Burns v. 
Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415, 419 (UT App.1994), to a third party tort of 
spoliation. (R. at 1231, | 2). Third, due to Appellee Skyline's admission of liability in 
Hills 1, Appellants probable expectancy is unaffected, thereby precluding the damages 
plead in Hills //pursuant to spoliation. (R. at 1233 - 1234, ^[ 1 -1). 
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1. SYNOPSIS OF SPOLIATION 
a. Spoliation's Foundation: Intentional Interference With Economic Relations 
The independent tort of spoliation was originally conceived in California, based upon 
the analogous tort of intentional interference with prospective economic relations: 
A recognized tort closely analogous to the alleged fact situation before us is 
the intentional interference with prospective business advantage. This tort 
permits recovery for interference with business relationships or 
expectations even in the absence of a legally binding agreement or where 
the expectations of the parties are only the subject of an unenforceable 
contract... Prosser in discussing this particular tort, observed that "a large 
part of what is most valuable in modern life depends upon 'probable 
expectancies,' [and] as social and industrial life become more complex the 
courts must do more to discover, define and protect them from undue 
interference."... While intentional spoliation of evidence has not been 
recognized as a tort heretofore, we conclude that a prospective civil action 
in a product liability case is a valuable "probable expectancy" that the court 
must protect from the kind of interference alleged herein. 
Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal.R 829, 831 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)(emphasis 
added) 
Jurisdictions that have subsequently adopted spoliation have likewise drawn parallels to 
intentional interference with prospective economic relations and also cited Smith for 
support.2 
Utah recognized intentional interference with prospective economic relations in 
Leigh Furniture, supra. In doing so, Utah adopted Oregon's definition. "[T]he plaintiff 
must prove (1) that the defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs existing or 
potential economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose or by improper means, (3) 
2
 See Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456, 464 (Ak.,1986); Oliver v. 
Stimson Lumber Co., 993 P.2d 11,18 (Mont, 1999); Holmes v. Amerex Rent-A-Car, 710 
A.2d 846, 851 (D.C.,1998); and Miller v. Allstate Insurance Company, 573 So.2d 24, 26 
(Fl.D. Ct. App., 1990). 
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causing injury to the plaintiff." Leigh Furniture, 657 P.2d at 304. In Anderson 
Development Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, 116 P.3d 323 (Utah, 2005), Utah more 
thoroughly examined intentional interference with prospective economic relations, and 
reflected "with respect to the second element, only one alternative, either improper 
purpose or improper means, need be established." Anderson at %21, 331. 
Although California subsequently retreated from acknowledging spoliation, ten 
other jurisdictions have adopted and retained spoliation as a cause of action: Alabama, 
Smith v. Atkinson, 711 So.2d 429 (Ala.,2000)(recognizing third party negligent spoliation 
and punitive damages if willful and wanton destruction of evidence); Alaska, Hazen v. 
Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456 (AK., 1986)(first party spoliation analogous to 
intentional interference with prospective business advantage); Townsendv. Conshor, Inc., 
832 So.2d 166 (Fl. Ct. App.,2002)(third party negligent spoliation against employer); 
Indiana, Thompson v. Owensby, 704 N.E.2d 134 (In. Ct. App.,1998)(third party negligent 
spoliation against insurer); Kansas, Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 241 Kan. 206 
(1987)(recognizing spoliation under special circumstances); Louisiana, Bethea v. Modern 
Biomedical Services, Inc., 704 So.2d 1227 (La. Ct. App.,1997)(third party spoliation 
against employer); Montana, Oliver v. Stimson Lumber Co., 993 P.2d 11 (Mt.,1999)(third 
party spoliation against employer); New Mexico, Coleman v Eddy Potash, 905 P.2d 
185(NM.,1985)(intentional spoliation against employer); Ohio, Smith v. Howard Johnson 
Co., 615 N.E.2d 1037 (Oh.,1993)(third party intentional spoliation recognized); West 
Virginia, Hannah v. Heeter, 584 S.E.2d 560 (W.Va.,2003)(recognizing third party 
negligent spoliation with special duty; and intentional spoliation by either party); and the 
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District of Columbia, Holmes v. Amerex Rent-A-Car, 710 A.2d 846 D.C., 1998 (third 
party negligent spoliation). 
b. Spoliation's Elements 
The elements that constitute spoliation are summarized in the Ohio case of Smith: 
"(1) pending or probable litigation involving the plaintiff, (2) knowledge on the part of 
defendant that litigation exists or is probable, (3) willful destruction of evidence by 
defendant designed to disrupt the plaintiffs case, (4) disruption of the plaintiffs case, and 
(5) damages proximately caused by the defendant's acts." Smith 615 N.E.2d at 1038. 
Jurisdictions acknowledging spoliation vary to a degree on these elements. The two most 
consistent variables are the nature of the duty to preserve evidence and the requirement of 
inability to prove the underlying suit.3 The former relates to a difference between 
negligent and intentional spoliation. Unlike intentional spoliation, with negligence "it is 
generally agreed ... some type of affirmative duty to preserve the evidence" must exist 
which "may arise through an agreement, a contract, a statute or another special 
circumstance." Hannah 584 S.E.2d at 568 - 569. In contrast, intentional spoliation can 
apply irrespective of a statutory duty; agreement; or special circumstance. Louisiana, in 
adopting spoliation, has stated: 
The absence of a statutory duty is not tantamount to no duty. The 
parameters of what constitutes fault in Louisiana reach far and wide in 
order to hold people accountable for their harmful actions regardless of 
whether or not their actions are covered by a statutory provision. 
Intentionally hindering a plaintiffs civil claim when there is no statutory 
3
 See for example, Coleman, 905 P.2d at 189 (N.M., 1995) or Oliver, 993 P.2d at 19 
(Mont, 1999). 
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duty to prevent this action is just as violative of our civilian notion of 
justice and fair play as when a statutory duty is imposed. For purposes of 
this issue, this court fails to see the benefit of making a distinction between 
a specific statutory duty and the far-reaching duty La.Civ.Code art. 2315 
imposes.4 
Bethea, 704So.2dat 1233 
c. Recognizing First or Third Party Spoliation 
In addition to whether an affirmative duty is necessary and what elements a 
jurisdiction chooses to define spoliation, the question of whether first party or third party 
causes of action should be recognized arises. Of the ten jurisdictions recognizing 
spoliation, almost all have recognized a third party cause of action.5 West Virginia 
summarizes the logic behind the necessity to recognize third party spoliation: 
Unlike a party to a civil action, a third party spoliator is not subject to an 
adverse inference instruction or discovery sanctions. Thus, when a third 
party destroys evidence, the party who is injured by the spoliation does not 
have the benefit of existing remedies. Such a result conflicts with our 
policy of providing a remedy for every wrong and compensating victims of 
tortious conduct. Accordingly, we believe that the negligent spoliation of 
evidence by a third party ought to be actionable in certain circumstances. 
Hannah, 560 S.E.2d at 568. 
The argument for first party spoliation varies. Alaska relies upon the analogous 
tort of intentional interference with prospective business advantage, as originally 
4
 LSA-C.C. Art. 2315. "Liability for acts causing damages. A. Every act whatever of 
man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it." 
5
 Alabama in Smith; Florida in Townsend; Indiana in Thompson; Louisiana in Bethea; 
Montana in Oliver; New Mexico in Coleman; Ohio in Smith; West Virginia in Hannah; 
and the District of Columbia in Holmes. 
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proffered in the California case of Smith v. Superior Court.6 Kansas bases first party 
spoliation upon an independent contract, agreement, voluntary assumption of duty, or 
special relationship.7 This analysis is essentially the same as the unique duty required by 
most jurisdictions to sustain a claim for negligent spoliation. West Virginia 
simultaneously acknowledges first and third party spoliation when either is committed 
intentionally, based upon an analysis that the destruction of evidence is highly improper 
and unjustifiable when facts indicate the first party intended to defeat a person's ability to 
prevail in a civil action. Hannah 584 S.E.2d at 571-572. 
d. Ripeness 
The appropriate time to file a spoliation claim is subject to debate. Some 
jurisdictions require adverse adjudication of the underlying suit before a claimant may 
seek redress via a separate suit while other jurisdictions favor simultaneous adjudication. 
As stated in Foster, "It appears to be unsettled whether the underlying suit must be tried 
or lost before the plaintiff can bring a claim for spoliation. Some courts suggest that 
plaintiffs should present their spoliation claim at the same time as the underlying claim, 
while other courts require the plaintiff to try and lose the underlying claim before 
bringing a spoliation claim." Foster 809 F.Supp. at 838. Ohio for example approves of 
spoliation being brought at the same time as the primary action, see Smith 615 N.E.2d at 
6
 Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d at 464. First party municipality sued for 
destroying arrest tapes in civil rights violation cause of action. 
Foster v. Lawrence Memorial Hospital, 809 F.Supp. 831, 838 (D. Kasas,1992), first 
party suit against physician by patient, applying Kansas Supreme Court's holding in 
Koplin recognizing spoliation in special circumstances due to statutorily imposed duty. 
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1038; whereas, Florida reasons a spoliation action does not arise until the underlying suit 
is completed. Lincoln Insurance Company v. Home Emergency Services, Inc., 812 So.2d 
433, 435. (Fl. Ct. App.,2002). 
e. Calculating Spoliation Damages 
Ascertaining spoliation damages is difficult at best given the uncertain nature of 
the harms caused. "This is so because the tort does not allow for standard calculations of 
damages to the proper degree of certainty." Holmes 710 A.2d at 852. Yet, as noted by 
the United States Supreme Court, "Where the tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude 
the ascertainment of the amount of damages with certainty, it would be a perversion of 
fundamental principles of justice to deny all relief to the injured person, and thereby 
relieve the wrongdoer from making any amend for his act." Holmes at 853, citing Stoiy 
Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931). In such 
situations, "the jury may make a just and reasonable estimate of damage based on 
relevant data." Id., citing Bigelow v. R.K.O. Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264-65 (1946). 
Indiana, in light of the unique challenges of proving spoliation damages based 
upon inability to prove an underlying suit, proffers a sensible alternative. Claimants can 
assert the damages incurred by the cost of retaining experts or conducting the additional 
discovery needed to provide alternative proof due to the destroyed evidence. Thompson, 
704 N.E.2d at FN 7. 
f. Spoliation Damages Are Outside Workers Compensation Coverage Formula 
The unique nature of spoliation damages, as a harm to probable expectancy, raises 
the issue of whether such injury falls within the coverage formula of workers 
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compensation exclusivity. Other jurisdictions, as noted in Appellants' Opposition to 
Appellees' Supplemental Briefs in Support of Renewed Motion to Dismiss (R. at 1 H i -
l l 71), do not consider spoliation damages within the physical injuries covered by 
workers compensation statutes. Pirocchi v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 365 F.Supp 
277 (E.D. Pa., 1973)(denying argument that tort immunity should apply to spoliation, as 
acts were unrelated to the cause of the physical injuries covered by workmen's 
compensation statutes); Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior Court, supra (injury alleged, 
disappearance of evidence, not a physical or emotional injury but an injury to property 
interest; therefore, workers compensation exclusivity inapplicable). 
Similar to these cases, four of the ten jurisdictions that presently recognize 
spoliation have held spoliation damages outside the scope of workers compensation 
coverage formulas. Florida reasons spoliation fails to qualify as "bodily injury" or 
"property damage", therefore an employer's liability insurer is not bound to defend and 
indemnify the employer. Lincoln, 812 So.2d at 436. The Lincoln opinion relied upon 
Florida's definition of the basis of a claim for spoliation as "an intangible and beneficial 
interest in the preservation of the evidence." Lincoln, at 435. As such, spoliation fails to 
qualify as harm to tangible property. Florida courts have also held the harm rendered by 
an employer who spoils evidence distinct from the bodily injury sustained by the 
employee. Id. citing Norris v. Colony Ins. Co., 760 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 4th D. Ct App., 
2000). 
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Louisiana also distinguishes spoliation on the basis of physical injury versus the 
unique damage caused by destruction of evidence. Within the context of employer's 
statutory immunity, Louisiana's Appellate Courts have stated: 
[T]he employer's statutory immunity from tort liability to its employee for a 
work-related physical injury does not, of itself, shield the employer from a 
claim for economic injury that the employee may suffer as a result of the 
employer's post-accident conduct, whether intentional or negligent, that 
may impair the employee's ability to recover tort damages for his injuries 
from third parties. 
Carter v. Exide Corporation, 661 So.2d 698, 704 (La.App. 2 Cir.,1995) (citations 
omitted) 
Montana takes a similar stance by recognizing that its workers compensation 
exclusivity provision only applies to internal or external physical harm to the body. 
However, loss or impairment of the ability to bring an action against a third party for 
spoliation does not qualify as an internal or external physical injury. Oliver, 993 P.2d at 
16-17. New Mexico follows suite finding spoliation inapplicable, as the type of personal 
injuries within workers compensation act are those related to a worker's physical or 
psychological job related disabilities. Coleman, 905 P.2d at 192. 
Utah has similarly held that non-physical and non-mental injuries are not within 
the exclusivity provision of Workers Compensation Act. "It is well settled that the Act 
covers only mental and physical injuries sustained on the job." Shattuck-Owen v. 
Snowbird Corp., 2000 UT 94, | 19, 16 P.3d 555, 560, citing Mounteer v. Utah Power & 
Light Co., 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991). In Mounteer, damages for slander were 
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determined to be outside the Act's immunity. The Mounteer opinion noted that 
provisions of the Act afford no compensation to an employee for defamation and, more 
importantly, the provisions relate to "a diminution or loss of earning power caused by a 
physical or mental injury or by death sustained in the work place. Damage to reputation 
does not fall within the coverage formula of our act." Mounteer at 1057. Ultimately, in 
Utah, what is dispositive with respect to coverage is the nature of the injury claimed, not 
the nature of defendant's act which the plaintiff alleges caused the injury. Mounteer at 
1057, citing Gambrell v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, 562 S.W.2d 163, 168 
(Mo.Ct.App. 1978). 
2. Application: Appellees Claims Constitute Spoliation and Should Be 
Recognized. 
Appellees UPS and Liberty Mutual engaged in actions which intentionally 
interfered with Appellants prospective legal action against Appellee Skyline. UPS with 
approval, sanctioning, and involvement from Liberty Mutual - despite the latter's 
familiarity with OSHA accident investigation requirements - instigated their own 
investigation; alteration; and destruction of evidence at the scene of the fatal 
electrocution. Appellees' actions were conducted with knowledge of potential legal 
action as evidenced, at a minimum, by the presence of Appellee UPS's counsel during the 
OSHA Compliance Officer's initial inspections and UPS's prohibition of any discussions 
8
 The Utah Supreme Court interpreted the Workers Compensation Act Utah Code Ann. § 
35-1-60 (1953), repealed and renumbered by Workers' Compensation Act of 1997, ch. 
375, § 35A-3-105, later renumbered and amended by U.C.A. 34A-2-105 (1999 and Supp. 
2001,2005). 
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by their third party electrician, Nolan Johnson (who's acts further altered the scene) from 
even talking with OSHA's Compliance Officer (R. at 917 - 119, fflf 17 - 23). 
Starting with the analogous tort of intentional interference with economic 
relations, as acknowledged by Utah in Leigh Furniture, supra, Appellees (1) intentionally 
interfered with evidence Appellants needed to pursue an underlying suit, as demonstrated 
by the willful violation OSHA initially issued; (2) Appellants effected such actions for an 
improper purpose, to hide the cause of the electrocution; and (3) the acts caused harm to 
Appellants by forcing Appellants' to file an action for spoliation given the uncertainty of 
causation and the viability of proving the underlying Hills I suit, and secondarily, harmed 
Appellants with the expense of litigating with non-party UPS to compel discovery in 
Hills I of the OSHA accident report (UPS had restricted OSHA from releasing the report. 
(R. at 825 - 827).); and the expense and time of litigating with UPS to compel the Heath 
Engineering reports and Heath Engineering personal responsible for evidence alteration 
and destruction. (R. at 913 - 927). 
Not only are Appellees UPS and Liberty Mutual's actions congruent with the 
elements outlined in Leigh Furniture's for intentional interference with prospective 
economic relations, but Appellees' actions meet the elements of spoliation as defined by 
the Ohio Supreme Court in Smith v. Howard Johnson Co, Inc. Mark Hills' wrongful 
death made litigation involving Appellants probable; the gravity of the event and 
Appellees' related evasive behavior indicates knowledge of probable litigation; the 
willful alteration and destruction of evidence by Appellees was designed to disrupt an 
investigation, and thereby impeded Appellants' probable suit; these actions of Appellees 
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disrupted Appellants' case as alleged herein; and Appellees' actions proximately caused 
damage to Appellants as alleged herein. 
Not only do Appellees UPS and Liberty Mutual's acts satisfy the spoliation 
elements set forth in the Ohio case of Smith, supra, but consistent with Florida; 
Louisiana; Montana; and New Mexico's case law the workers compensation exclusivity 
provision should not apply. The harms caused by Appellees acts were neither physical 
nor mental injuries - instead damage was inflicted to Appellants' probable expectancy in 
Hills I. And, it is well settled, Utah's Worker's Compensation Act only covers mental 
and physical harms sustained on the job. Shattuck-Owen v. Snowbird Corp., 2000 UT 94, 
If 19, 16 P.3d 555, 560. Furthermore, consistent with Mounteer, Appellants' spoliation 
damages are unrelated to a diminution of or loss of earning power resulting from Mark 
Hills' death. The nature of the injury claimed by Appellants is damage to their economic 
expectancy from a lawsuit, something well outside the coverage formula of the Act. 
With respect to spoliation elements that vary from Ohio's, should this Court prefer 
different parameters such as the inability to prove the underlying suit, Appellants contend 
irrespective of the status Hills /, that Appellants' probable expectancy has been damaged. 
Appellants' net recovery in Hills I has been reduced due to the cost in dealing with 
Appellees UPS and Liberty Mutual, who as non-parties to the original Hills I lawsuit, 
actively engaged in an initial cover up of the cause of Mark Hills' death; prolonged this 
cover-up; delayed and ultimately denied taking of depositions; and impeded access to 
reports relative to the fatal electrocution - all evidence and materials necessary for 
Appellants to effectively bring suit against Skyline in Hills L Congruent with this 
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damage claim of Appellants is the reasoning of the Indiana Court of Appeals in the case 
of Thompson v. Owensby, supra. Spoliation damages can likewise be asserted via the 
costs incurred by having to adjust one's case to the impact of the spoliator's actions - and 
not solely via proof of uncertain damages in an unprovable action. Therefore, 
Appellants' additional expenses incurred are analogous to those deemed appropriate in 
Thompson, supra. 
In addition, as explained by the Supreme United States Court in Story Parchment, 
supra, irrespective of the uncertainty of damages, "it would be a perversion of 
fundamental principles of justice to deny all relief to the injured person, and thereby 
relieve the wrongdoer from making any amend for his act." A jury, given Appellants' 
relevant Hills I expenses data, could make a just and reasonable estimate of damages. 
Also outside the parameters of Ohio's elements for spoliation is the general 
requirement that negligent spoliation entail a specific duty to preserve evidence via 
agreement, statute, contract, or other special circumstances. Appellants concede OSHA 
codes are improper to denote a duty relative to negligent spoliation.9 But, consistent with 
intentional spoliation and Louisiana's analysis in Bethea, supra, the absence of a specific 
statutory duty should not equate to no duty. This Court, just as Louisiana's Court of 
Appeals reasoned in Bethea, should find intentional hindrance with a lawful action 
9
 Although Appellees UPS and Liberty Mutual, the latter through its contracting of Heath 
Engineering, violated U.C.A. R614-1-1-5.C.6, "Tools, equipment, materials or other 
evidence that might pertain to the cause of such accident shall not be removed or 
destroyed until so authorized by the Labor Commission or one of its Compliance 
Officers", a duty cannot be imposed due to this transgression as U.C.A. 34A-6-110 
prohibits use of OSHA provisions to affect common law duties. 
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violative of justice and fair play irrespective of whether a specific statutory duty is 
imposed. 
The Trial Court, in its Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Defendants' 
Renewed Motion to Dismiss, which granted summary judgment on all of Appellants' 
Hills II claims, mistakenly argues Hills I was the proper mechanism to seek damages 
against Appellees for the harms caused by intentional spoliation. (R. at 1229, FN 2). 
This argument overlooks the inability to seek redress against Appellees UPS and Liberty 
Mutual in Hills /, given neither Appellee was actually a named defendant.10 Third party 
spoliation claims were created to explicitly address this problem. A third party spoliator, 
as noted by West Virginia in Hannah, supra, unlike a party to a civil action, is not subject 
to an adverse inference instruction or discovery sanctions. Thus, when a third party 
destroys evidence, the party who is injured by the spoliation does not have the benefit of 
existing remedies. Without implementing the Hills II litigation, Appellants simply lacked 
meaningful recourse against Appellees UPS and Liberty Mutual.11 
10
 The Trial Court also errors in stating, "If Defendants had hindered or delayed for an 
improper purpose, this Court would expect to see motions to compel and motions for 
sanctions in Hills I." (R. at 1229, FN 2). In fact, during Hills I Appellants and Appellee 
Skyline were (1) forced to join and compel production of non-parties Appellees UPS and 
Liberty Mutual's Heath Engineering electrician along with his scene altering inspection 
documents. (R. at 913 - 927) and (2) Appellants and Appellee Skyline were forced to 
join and motion the Hills I court to release OSHA's accident report, which non-party 
UPS had proclaimed to contain "confidential business information." (R. at 823 - 830). 
11
 Utah's limited exploration of spoliation in Burns v. Cannodale, as observed in the Trial 
Court's Memorandum Decision and Order of September 9, 2008 (R. at 1231, f 2), merely 
touched upon first party spoliation. As such, Burns provides limited guidance for the 
third party spoliation claims against UPS and Liberty Mutual. 
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The Trial Court also erred in asserting Appellants filing of Hills / /may have been 
premature. (R. at 1229, FN 2). True, jurisdictions recogQizing spoliation are in 
disagreement as to whether the underlying suit needs to be brought to conclusion, as 
noted in Foster by the Federal District Court of Kansas. But, Appellants contend - as 
espoused by Ohio in Smith - that a spoliation action may be brought simultaneously with 
the primary suit. 
B. APPELLANTS STATED CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY THE WORKERS COMPENSATION 
EXCLUSIVITY PROVISION As THE DUAL CAPACITY DOCTRINE APPLIES. 
The Trial Court's September 9, 2008 Memorandum Decision and Order (R. at 11241140), 
in dismissing with prejudice all claims against Appellees, also refuted Appellants' argument 
that the Workers Compensation Act exclusivity provision was inapplicable. Appellants' 
opposition reasoned that the harm that had occurred arose outside the course of decedent 
Mark Hills' employment - thereby implicating the dual capacity doctrine, not to mention 
spoliation case law distinguished the physical injuries afforded workers compensation 
exclusivity versus the economic harm of spoliation. 
1. Dual Capacity Doctrine 
Utah Workers Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann, § 34A-2-105(l)(1999) 
provides in pertinent part: 
The right to recover compensation pursuant to this chapter for injuries 
sustained by an employee, whether resulting in death or not, shall be the 
exclusive remedy against the employer .... and the liabilities of the 
employer imposed by this chapter shall be in place of any and all other civil 
liability whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to the employee ... 
employee's ... parent ... next of kin, heirs, personal representatives ... on 
account of any accident or injury or death, in any way contracted, 
sustained, aggravated, or incurred by the employee in the course of or 
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because of or arising out of the employee's employment and no action may 
be maintained against an employer or against any officer, agent, or 
employee of the employer based upon any accident, injury, or death of an 
employee. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-105(l)(1999)(emphasis added). 
The specific exclusionary language of the Act, "in the course of or because of or 
arising out of the employee's employment," raises the corollary that injuries sustained 
outside the course of employment are not limited to the Act's remedies. Such 
circumstances implicate the dual capacity doctrine which has been discussed by three 
Utah cases - albeit never adopted. Hunsaker v. State, 870 P.2d 893 (Utah 1993); Stewart 
v. CM Corp., 740 P.2d 1340, 1341 (Utah 1987)(per curiam); and Bingham v. Lagoon 
Corp., 707 P.2d 678, 679-80 (Utah 1985). 
In Hunsaker, the dual capacity definition was outlined as, 
"that theory under which an employer who normally enjoys immunity from 
common-law and statutory liability under the exclusive remedy provision 
of workers' compensation law may become liable to an employee when 
acting in a capacity outside the employer-employee relationship, which 
capacity may impose obligations apart from those imposed as an 
employer." 
Hunasker at 898 (citations omitted). 
In 1985, the Utah Supreme Court made an initial examination of the dual capacity 
doctrine in Bingham and clarified that a capacity outside the employer-employee 
relationship is ascertained by whether this second capacity generates obligations 
unrelated to the employer's first role as an employer. Bingham, at 680. The Tenth 
12
 "The decisive test to determine if the dual capacity doctrine is invokable is not whether 
the second function or capacity of the employer is different and separate from the first. 
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Circuit Court of Appeals, interpreting Utah law, applied Bingham decision in Worthen v. 
Kennecott Corporation, 780 F.2d 856 (10th Cir., 1985) to determine whether dual 
capacity existed. An employer was sued due to employees' attempts to save a dying 
employee and these efforts were ultimately alleged to have killed him. Although dual 
capacity was not found, the Worthen opinion noted that Utah's interpretation of the 
Worker's Compensation Act, clearly affords protection "for the broad range of 
foreseeable events set in motion by the on-the-job injury." Worthen, supra, at 859. 
When spoliation was initially adopted in California, it was recognized that the dual 
capacity doctrine bore applicability to spoliation claims against employers. In Coca Cola 
Bottling Co. v. Superior Court, 233 Cal. App.3d 1273, 286 Cal.Rptr. 855 (1991), the 
employer was deemed to have a second capacity as a voluntary caretaker of evidence - a 
role that was distinct from Coca Cola's first role as claimant's employer. Coca Cola had 
retained the evidence in question, a defective delivery truck, with no agreement or 
affirmative duty to claimant. Ultimately critical parts of the vehicle were destroyed. The 
court, in support of this second distinct role - which was deemed outside workers 
compensation exclusivity, noted that this obligation as an evidentiary caretaker arose 
after the claimant's industrial injury.1"' 
Rather, the test is whether the employer's conduct in the second role or capacity has 
generated obligations that are unrelated to those flowing from the company's or 
individual's first role as an employer. If the obligations are related, the doctrine is not 
applicable." Bingham at 680. 
13
 "The second capacity which Coca-Cola allegedly occupied was as the voluntary 
caretaker of the evidence related to the Joneses' claim against Ford and the County, and 
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2. Application: The Dual Capacity Doctrine Precludes Workers Compensation 
Exclusivity. 
Appellee UPS was acting in a capacity outside the employer-employee 
relationship when it altered and destroyed critical evidence. At this point, after the death 
of Mark Hills, and congruent with the facts in Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior Court, 
Appellee UPS had a second role unrelated to its first role as Marks' former employer. 
UPS was an evidentiary steward for components critical to proving a probable lawsuit 
against Appellee Skyline. 
Based upon Bingham, the counter-argument may be made that UPS's obligations 
as an evidentiary caretaker arose as a result of its first role as Mark's employer. But, the 
obligation to preserve evidence arises irrespective of whether UPS was Mark's employer. 
Any citizen of Utah, with no relation of any kind to Mark Hills, and present at the 
electrocution scene - knowing the facts of the underlying accident - would be obligated 
to not intentionally destroy evidence and liable if they did intentionally destroy evidence. 
Similar to the Lousiana Court of Appeals logic in Bethea, Appellant UPS had a general 
duty unrelated to being Mark's employer. Further, as noted in Bingham, the test is 
whether the employer's conduct has generated unrelated obligation. Here, UPS's 
intentional conduct creates a liability that was not related to its role as Marks employer. 
Or, applying the Worthen court's analysis - UPS's intentional spoliation conduct is not a 
to Ford's and the County's defenses to those claims. That second capacity came into 
existence after James Jones's industrial injury, and thus the exclusivity provisions of 
section 3602 would not be applicable to the fifth cause of action by the Joneses against 
Coca-Cola for negligent spoliation of evidence." Coca Cola at 1293, 867. 
31 
foreseeable circumstance that would be expected as a result of the employee-employer 
relationship. 
C. APPELLANTS STATED CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY UTAH WORKERS COMPENSATION 
ACT EXCLUSIVITY AS APPELLEES ACTS WERE INTENTIONAL. 
1. Workers Compensation Does Not Bar Intentional Acts 
Utah precludes intentional injuries from the protection afforded by the Utah 
Workers Compensation Act. In Bryan v. Utah Intl, 533 P.2d 892 (Utah 1975), Utah recognized 
the inapplicability of the Act's exclusion to intentional harms stating, "[w]e think that such a 
provision is not a prohibition against the maintenance of an action for damages, because of an 
intentional act The policy of our law has always been to allow one injured through the intentional 
act of another, to seek redress from the one intending harm." Bryan, supra, 894. Recently, this 
Supreme Court clarified what constitutes an intentional act in Helfv. Chevron USA., Inc., — P.3d -
--, 2009 WL 348763 (Utah), 2009 UT 11. Adopting the "intent to injure" standard held by other 
jurisdictions, this Court stated the "intent to injure" analysis focuses on whether the actor knew or 
expected that injury would occur as a consequence of his actions, thereby distinguishing between 
intentional and unintentional workplace injuries under the Act This analysis removes the question of 
motive and instead asks whether the injuries resulting from the intentional act were unknown or 
unexpected versus injuries that would be know or expected as the result of an intentional act. 
New Mexico has specifically addressed the interplay between intentional spoliation and the 
workers compensation exclusivity bar. In Coleman v. Eddy Potash, the New Mexico Supreme 
Court held that coverage under their workers compensation act is limited to accidental injuries In 
acknowledging this, the court held that a worker's claim against his employer for intentional 
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spoliation of evidence is not barred by New Mexico's exclusivity provisions. Coleman 905 P.2d 
at 193. 
2. Appellee UPS and Liberty MutuaPs Harms Were Intentional 
Appellees UPS and Liberty MutuaPs acts resulting in spoliation of evidence were 
intentional. Immediately after the electrocution, UPS initiated actions that altered and 
destroyed causation evidence. (R. at 180-182). Ultimately, UPS was charged with 
willfully violating Utah Administrative Code R614-1-5.C.6, which required UPS to not 
remove or destroy tools, equipment, materials or other evidence that might pertain to an 
accident. (R. at 920, f 2). Meanwhile, Appellee Liberty Mutual, despite its inherent 
knowledge of OSHA laws and contrary to the Compliance Officer's order, sanctioned use 
of and hired non-party Heath Engineering (R. at 239, | 5; at 923, | 2) to investigate and 
therein alter the scene of the electrocution and destroy evidence.14 
Both Appellees UPS and Liberty Mutual would know or expect the alteration or 
destruction of evidence at the scene of an electrocution to deter the ability to ascertain the 
cause of the electrocution. Consequently, all parties interested in the cause of the 
accident would be harmed. There is nothing unexpected or unknown about this outcome 
as a result of Appellees' acts. If evidence alteration or destruction did not effectively 
hide; impede; or thwart responsibility, why would any malfeasant bother with the 
undertaking? 
14
 It should be noted, since Liberty Mutual and UPS have effectively thwarted any 
discovery in this action, specifics of what was altered and destroyed have not been fully 
clarified. 
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Furthermore, appellees UPS and Liberty Mutual acts and the damage to 
Appellants cannot be termed accidental. Affirmative actions were taken by both these 
Appellees that resulted in harm to Appellants. And, as non-accidental events - just as 
New Mexico reasoned in Coleman with intentional spoliation - Appellees' actions fall 
within he intentional injury exception of Utah's Workers Compensation Act. 
It should also be noted that public policy favors redress for intentional harms. In 
Bryan, this Court observed that it has always been the policy of our law "[t]o allow one 
injured through the intentional act of another, to seek redress from those intending harm." 
Bryan, at 894. The reason for such a policy is to deter intentional injurious behavior. Id. 
UPS's actions exemplify the type of intentional acts excepted from the exclusive remedy 
provision of the Act and as a matter of public policy Appellants should not be subject to 
the Workers' Compensation exclusive remedy bar. 
D. APPELLEE LIBERTY MUTUAL SHOULD HAVE NOT BEEN DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 
As A NON-EMPLOYER, THE WORKERS COMPENSATION EXCLUSIVITY BAR WAS 
INAPPLICABLE TO LIBERTY MUTUAL AND THIRD PARTY INSURERS HAVE BEEN HELD 
LIABLE FOR SPOLIATION. 
The exclusive remedy provision of the Workers Compensation Act provides, in 
pertinent part, "The right to recover compensation pursuant to this chapter for injuries 
sustained by an employee, whether resulting in death or not, shall be the exclusive 
remedy against the employer," Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-105(l)(emphasis added). As 
noted, the statue explicitly states the Act's remedies are solely a benefit which employers 
may receive. 
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At least three different jurisdictions have held third party non-employer insurers 
liable for spoliation. In the Indiana case of Thompson v. Owensby, a third party insurer 
took control of evidence and thereafter lost it, consequently impairing a claimant's suit 
against a property owner and the manufacturer of the allegedly defective evidence. The 
claimant argued, given an insurer is in the business of liability protection, they should 
rationally realize the possibility of litigation and the necessity to consequently preserve 
evidence. Thompson, 704 N.E.2d at 137. The Indiana Court of Appeals found claimant's 
argument persuasive and held, under negligent spoliation, liability existed for the insurer. 
Metropolitan Insurance was held liable in a negligent spoliation action by the 
Supreme Court of Alabama. In Smith v. Atkinson, the insurer took possession of a 
minivan involved in a car accident and destroyed it before the claimant could inspect the 
vehicle to sustain a product liability claim against a third party manufacturer. The 
Atkinson court held that under such circumstances, a third party claim for negligence 
would be recognized. Atkinson 111 So.2d at 432. In Miller v. Allstate Insurance, the 
Florida District Court of Appeals similarly held an insurer liable for the destruction of 
evidence needed for an underlying products liability suit on a defective vehicle. 
Although not specified, the case law cited in Miller indicates the claim was for negligent 
spoliation as the court relied on a contractual duty between the parties. Miller, 573 So. at 
27. 
It should be noted that these three cases pertaining to insurers, Thompson, 
Atkinson, and Miller, all involved causes of action for negligent spoliation. As noted 
earlier by West Virginia in Hannah v. Heeter "it is generally agreed...some type of 
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affirmative duty to preserve the evidence" must exist which "may arise through an 
agreement, a contract, a statute or another special circumstance" during negligent 
spoliation. Hannah 584 S.E.2d at 568 - 569. In Miller, a contract existed to preserve the 
evidence, Miller, 573 So.2d at 26; in Atkinson the insurer promised to preserve the car, 
Atkinson 711 So.2d at 431; and in Thompson a duty transpired via special circumstances. 
Thompson is telling, as the duty to preserve arose - not from an agreement or contract -
but via the insurer's practices given the nature of the business an insurer is in: 
[T]he duty at issue does not arise from the Insurance Company's conduct 
vis-a-vis the Thompsons. Instead, the duty arises from the Company's 
business practice regarding the collection and preservation of evidence. A 
liability insurance carrier would be hard-pressed to conduct business 
without some mechanism for collecting and preserving evidence, be it by 
performing those tasks internally or by ensuring that the tasks are 
performed externally. When, as the allegations here suggest, the carrier is in 
a better position than the lay claimant to understand the significance of 
evidence and the need to maintain it, the carrier can validly be held to a 
duty to maintain the evidence. To fulfill its duty the Insurance Company 
did not need to conduct itself in any particular manner with regard to the 
Thompsons. Rather, the Insurance Company needed only to exercise an 
appropriate degree of care in maintaining evidence that could have been 
relevant to an underlying claim. 
Thompson, 704 N.E.2d at 138. 
In the instant case, Liberty Mutual in no way could be construed as Mark Hills' 
employer. Pursuant to the Workers compensation Act exclusivity provisions, Utah Code 
Ann. § 34A-2-105(1), remedies under the Act are only available to employers. 
Therefore, Liberty Mutual cannot qualify for exclusion from acts constituting negligence 
or intentional tort. 
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Specifically, with respect to the Appellants' negligent spoliation claim against 
Liberty Mutual, in light of the nature of the business an insurer is in - and the ever 
present likelihood of lawsuits by those harmed by the insured, Liberty Mutual had a duty 
to not instigate actions that would alter or destroy critical evidence of an electrocution. 
Just as reasoned in Thompson, Liberty Mutual's business practices with respect to 
preserving evidence give rise to a duty. Liberty Mutual, as one of the largest workers 
compensation insurers in the country, fully understood the significance of the evidence at 
the scene of the electrocution not to mention knew OSHA regulations regarding evidence 
preservation. Despite this Liberty Mutual sanctioned the illegal non-0 SHA 
investigations that occurred at the UPS facility, and more egregiously, Liberty Mutual 
hired Heath Engineering to come onsite thereby altering and destroying evidence at the 
scene of the electrocution. (R. at 923, ^  2). 
Given these acts, and the duty imposed upon an insurer - within the rubric put 
forth by Thompson - Liberty Mutual should not be dismissed from the negligent 
spoliation claim made by Appellants. Furthermore, Liberty Mutual should not be 
dismissed from Appellants claim for intentional spoliation - the guidelines of which were 
previously discussed in Sections A and B - as no affirmative duty is required and Liberty 
Mutual's acts were intentional. 
E. APPELLEES PRAYER FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES SHOULD BE REINSTATED AS PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES HAVE BEEN HELD A VIABLE DETERRENT IN CASES OF INTENTIONAL 
SPOLIATION 
Utah allows the assessment of punitive damages pursuant to Utah Code Ann., § 
78B-8-201 (1953) which provides, in pertinent part: 
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Except as otherwise provided by statute, punitive damages may be awarded 
only if compensatory or general damages are awarded and it is established 
by clear and convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of the tortfeasor 
are the result of willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct, 
or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a 
disregard of, the rights of others. 
Utah Code Ann., § 78B-8-201(l)(a)(1953) 
Based upon this statutory definition, it has been held "[i]n Utah, punitive damages 
are available only upon clear and convincing proof of "willful and malicious or 
intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless 
indifference toward, and disregard of, the rights of others." "While simple negligence 
will not support punitive damages, negligence manifesting a knowing and reckless 
indifference toward the rights of others will." Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc. 82 P.3d 1064, 
1017 (Utah, 2003)(internal citations omitted). 
Although Utah has never considered punitive damages relative to spoliation, the 
destruction of documents in a legal proceeding and consequently whether punitive 
damages should apply, has been considered. In Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 2001 UT 89, 65 P.3d 1134, the defendant was assessed punitive damages for its 
systematic destruction of evidence and harassing and exhausting legal opponents. 
"Behaviors that undermine the efficiency and integrity of the judicial process may also be 
considered under the rubric of the second Crookston /factor (appropriateness of punitive 
damages); in Campbell we singled out for censure the defendant's systematic destruction 
of documents related to its challenged activities and its policy of harassing and 
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exhausting legal opponents." Diversified Holdings, L.C. v. Turner, 2002 UT 129,1 17, 
63 P.3d 686, 695-696. 
At least two jurisdictions that have adopted spoliation have acknowledged punitive 
damages as appropriate in cases of intentional spoliation. Alabama, in Smith v. Atkinson, 
explained, "if the spoliator is found to have acted willfully or wantonly in the destruction 
of the evidence, then punitive damages can be levied against the spoliator in an amount 
adequate to punish the spoliator for its misconduct and to deter others in similar 
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situations." Smith, 711 So.2d at 438. West Virginia seconds this perspective, "in 
addition to compensatory damages, punitive damages may be awarded in cases where 
evidence was intentionally spoliated." Hannah, 584 S.E.2d at 573. The Hannah opinion 
goes onto to note that willful conduct affecting the rights of others falls within West 
Virginia's definition of acts meriting punitive damages. 
Appellees UPS and Liberty Mutual engaged in knowing and reckless disregard of 
Appellants' right to critical causation evidence necessary to prove a wrongful death 
action. Not only were Appellees UPS and Liberty Mutual indifferent and intentional in 
their disregard of evidence preservation immediately after the electrocution, in addition, 
long after the electrocution these Appellees continued to engage in knowing 
contravention of Appellees' legal cause of action in Hills L UPS obfuscated the 
spoliation that had occurred by hindering Appellants access to information necessary to 
prove causation against Skyline. Appellants were forced to compel the OSHA accident 
report as well as a compel deposition testimony and production of documents solely in 
Appellee UPS's possession, all of which were indicative of the cause of the electrocution. 
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These acts constituted "conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference 
toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others," as designated in U.C.A., § 78B-8-
201(l)(a). The intentional destruction of evidence critical to ascertaining a Mark Hills' 
death by both Appellees UPS and Liberty Mutual, via UPS's immediate unauthorized 
investigation and again via Heath Engineering's unauthorized investigation, shortly after 
Marks' death, and subsequent efforts to hide this evidence by Appellees reflect "more 
than mere negligence." These behaviors were an affront to the legal system and 
undermined the efficiency and integrity of the judicial process - directly impeding 
Appellants' case against Appellee Skyline in Hills L As such, just as contemplated in 
Diversified Holdings, and held in Campbell based upon document destruction, punitive 
damages are appropriate. And, there is nothing novel in this assessment, both Alabama 
and West Virginia have deemed punitive damages suitable in cases of intentional 
spoliation. 
VDL CONCLUSION 
The District Court erred when it granted Appellee UPS's Motion to Dismiss, with prejudice, 
as Appellants' allegations were sufficiently pled to constitute spoliation - a case of action that should 
be recognized in Utah; sufficiently pled to invoke the dual capacity doctrine; and sufficiently pled to 
fall within the "intentional acf' exception to Utah's Workers Compensation Act; 
Moreover, Appellee Liberty Mutual should have not been dismissed with prejudice, as the 
Workers Compensation Act exclusivity provision does not apply to Liberty Mutual, given Liberty 
Mutual did not employ decedent Mark Hills. Furthermore, Liberty Mutual was directly engaged in 
the initial spoliation of evidence, by sanctioning UPS's inspection, alteration, and destruction of 
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evidence prior to OSHA's inspection - and hiring Heath Engineering which further altered and 
destroyed evidence. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EDWARD RJIORIARITY (Bar No. 5882) 
Bradley L Booke (Bar No. 9984) 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT 
BRUCE HILLS AND JUDITH HILLS, 
individually and as natural parents and 
heirs of MARK D. HILLS (Deceased), 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SKYLINE ELECTRIC COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation, 
Defendant, 
MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER 
(Motion to Consolidate Cases for 
Discovery) 
CaseNo.040107128 
Judge Stephen L. Roth 
BRUCE HILLS and JUDITH HILLS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC., 
and Ohio corporation, et al 
Case No. 050407708 
Judge Royal Hansen 
This matter comes before the court for decision on Skyline Electric Company's (Skyline) 
Motion to Consolidate for purposes of discovery only. Having considered the filings of both Skyline 
and non-party United Parcel Service, Inc.'s (UPS), the court concludes thai to avoid unnecessary 
I 
costs and delay Skyline's Motion is GRANTED based upon the following Minute Entry and Order. 
BACKGROUND 
On October 15,2004, Plaintiffs Bruce and Judith Hills filed this wrongful death suit for the 
death of their son, Mark D. Hills, against Skyline (Hills I). Plaintiffs alleged Skyline was liable for 
i 
the electrocution of their son, which occurred while he was working at UPS. The case was assigned 
to this court. 
On December 2,2004, Skyline filed a Notice of Intention to Apportion Fault against UPS. 
On August 16,2005, Plaintiffs filed suit against UPS, Liberty Mutual, and Skyline alleging 
that those defendants negligently and intentionally destroyed or altered evidence relevant to the 
electrocution of Mark D. Hills (Hills II). Hills II was assigned to Judge Royal L Hansen of the Third 
District Court. In Hills II, Skyline filed a cross claim against UPS alleging negligence and 
intentional spoliation of evidence in connection with the electrocution of Mark D, Hills. Liberty 
Mutual and UPS have filed motions to dismiss alleging the tort of spoliation has not been recognized 
in Utah. In Hills I, Skyline has raised as one of its defenses that spoliation of evidence by UPS 
makes proof of Skyline's responsibility for the death impossible. 
At a hearing regarding the motions to dismiss in Hills II, the issue of consolidation for 
discovery purposes was raised and the court set a deadline for filing a consolidation motion. 
Thereafter, Skyline filed the present motion to consolidate Hills I and Hills II for discovery 
purposes. 
LAW 
Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the 
court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the 
actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders 
concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay. 
DISCUSSION 
Both Hills I and Hills II involve common questions of fact, as both cases relate to the 
circumstances surrounding the death of Mark D. Hills. By the nature of a spoliation claim, Hills I 
will have to be resolved adversely to plaintiffs, as a result of evidence spoliation, before Hills II can 
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go forward to trial While there will be some discovery in each case not related to the other, much 
of it will overlap. Many, if not all, of the witnesses that would testify in Hills I would likely be 
witnesses in Hills II and vice versa. In fact, if Hills II goes forward, negligence issues pertinent to 
Hills I will still be relevant in Hills II, because, as the court understands the spoliation claim, the 
plaintiff must prove that it would have prevailed in Hills I had it not been for the alleged spoliation 
of evidence by the defendants, and must prove the damages it would have obtained if it prevailed 
on liability in that case. The cases therefore are significantly intertwined factually and legally, even 
if they must be tried separately, one after the other, based on separate tort theories. The cases 
therefore appear to have common, though not identical, issues. 
So, rather than call a number of witnesses to separate depositions for each case, possibly 
months or years apart, the court concludes that it is reasonable for them to be deposed one time for 
both cases and for other discovery to proceed at one time in both cases. To consolidate Hills I and 
Hills II for purposes of discovery only would avoid the additional costs and time associated with 
repeated depositions of the same witnesses and other duplicative discovery. To consolidate would 
also preserve witness testimony for Hills II while memories are fresh, rather than waiting to conduct 
discovery in Hills II until Hills I has been tried and decided (and perhaps appealed). 
Consolidation would also avoid ongoing disputes over the scope of discovery of individual 
witnesses as it relates to the separate issues in each case and ensure that relevant discovery obtained 
in each case is useable in the other, by and against all parties. While there have been and will 
continue to be disagreements among the parties as to which evidence is relevant or irrelevant to each 
case, those disputes are more readily resolved with regard to admissibility at trial and should not 
continue to be the source of dispute and impediments to discovery as they apparently have been in 
3 
the separate cases in the past. Furthermore, to consolidate for discovery purposes would preserve 
court resources; rather than having two courts addressing similar discovery motions, discovery 
disputes can be decided in one setting. 
Finally, UPS raises the issue that a motion to dismiss is pending in Hills II that could dispose 
of the case in their favor. That issue appears to have been submitted for decision a second time, so 
it ought to be resolved within a relatively short time. Given the age of these cases, discovery should 
not be further stayed while awaiting that decision. 
ORDER 
The court GRANTS Skyline's Motion and hereby ORDERS that Hills I and Hills II be 
consolidated for discovery only, with all discovery matters relating to both cases to come before this 
court. Any other proceedings shall be brought before the court in which the case was assigned. 
Dated this /O day of February, 2007. 
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UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC 
Defendant, 
RULING AND ORDER STAYING 
PENDING MOTIONS TO DISMISS 
UNTIL RESOLUTION OF HELLS I 
Case No. 050407708 
Honorable Terry Christiansen 
The undersigned was assigned to preside over this case (hereinafter referred to as "Hills 
IT) by Order dated February 21,2006 as a result of Judge Royal Hansen recusing himself based 
upon prior representation of Defendant's UPS and Liberty Mutual, and serving as co-counsel 
with Edward Moriarity. 
A status conference was held before the undersigned on April 13, 2007 to discuss the 
status of Hills II. The Court specifically desired to ascertain the position of the parties regarding 
whether all pending motions should be stayed pending resolution of Hills vs. Skyline Electric 
Co., Civil action #040107128 assigned to Judge Roth (hereinafter referred to as "Hills I"). Judge 
Roth recently consolidated Hills I and Hills II for discovery purposes. The parties were unable to 
agree whether Hills II should be stayed pending resolution of Hills I or if the court should render 
a decision on the pending Motions to Dismiss filed by Defendant United Parcel Services and 
Defendant Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company and Defendant Liberty Mutual Holding 
Company, Inc. 
1 
The undersigned has reviewed the pleadings of the parties and the entire file, including 
reading transcripts of the hearings before Judge Hansen on April 25,2006 and October 11,2006. 
Based on said review, I conclude that Hills II should be stayed pending resolution of Hills I for 
the following reasons. 
1. With the consolidation of discovery in Hills I and Hills II by Judge Roth, the 
parties can determine exactly what occurred that caused the electrocution death of 
Mark Hills at the UPS facility in West Valley, Utah, and what changes were made 
and by whom to the scene of the accident which constitute the "spoliation of 
evidence" claim. 
2. The issue whether Utah Courts recognize the tort of "Spoliation of evidence" 
has not been determined. I believe the better policy is to determine the nature, 
extent, viability and propriety of recognizing such a claim or tort, not in the 
abstract, but with the benefit of discovery to fully understand and appreciate what 
occurred and the effects of the actions taken. In other words, this court should 
have a complete and thorough record of the facts to determine such an important 
public policy issue. 
3. It is necessary for Hills I to be resolved to determine whether plaintiffs are 
unable to prove their case in Hills I due to "Spoliated Evidence". 
Based on the foregoing, any previous Notices to Submit are hereby set aside, and a new 
Notice to Submit should be filed if necessary on the following Motions after resolution of Hills I: 
1. Defendant United Parcel Services' Motion to Dismiss filed 11-7-05; 
2. Defendant Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company and Defendant Liberty 
2 
Mutual Holding Company's Motion to Dismiss filed 11-9-05; 
3. Defendant United Parcel Services Motion to Dismiss Cross Claim by 
Defendant Skyline Electric Company filed 2-6-06; 
This Ruling and Order is the Order of the Court and no other Order is required. 
3 
Mailing Certificate 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the Ruling and Order Staying 
Pending Motions To Dismiss Until Resolution of Hills I to the following Attorneys. 
Dated this 4th day of May, 2007 
~v\W-^ 
Court Clerk O 
Edward Moriarity 
Jacque Ramos 
8 East Broadway, Suite 312 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Taggert Hansen 
1801 California Street, Suite 4200 
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Michael Dyer 
Kira Slawson 
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Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Gary Johnson 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
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Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Dennis James 
Sara Becker 
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Kearns Building, Eighth Floor 




BLACKBURN & STOLL, PC 
257 East 200 South, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-7900 
Facsimile: (801)521-7965 
Taggart Hansen (admitted pro hac vice) 
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP 
1801 California Street, Suite 4200 
Denver, Colorado 80202 
Telephone: (303) 298-5700 
Facsimile: (303)313-2857 
Attorneys for United Parcel Service Inc. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST JORDAN DIVISION STATE OF UTAH 
BRUCE HILLS AND JUDITH HILLS 
Individually, and as natural parents and heirs of 
MARK D. HILLS (deceased); 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE INC., an Ohio 
corporation; UPSCO UNITED PARCEL 
SERVICE CO., a Delaware corporation 
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE INC., a Utah 
corporation; LIBERTY MUTUAL HOLDING 
COMPANY, INC., a Massachusetts Mutual 
Holding Company; LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Massachusetts 
Mutual Holding Company; and SKYLINE 
ELECTRIC COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
JdSOM -f3Rg@t&g£Zq ORDER mm RE: 
DEFENDANTS' RENEWED MOTION 
TO DISMISS BASED ON MOOTNESS 
Civil No. 1:050407708 
Judge Terry Christiansen 
BRUCE HILLS AND JUDITH HILLS 
Individually, and as natural parents and heirs of 
MARK D. HILLS (deceased); 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SKYLINE ELECTRIC COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation, 
Civil No. 1:040107128 
Judge Stephen Roth 
TVfendanl 
Defendant United Parcel Service Inc. ("UPS") filed a renewed motion to dismiss the 
claims asserted by plaintiffs Bruce Hills and Judith Hills ("Plaintiffs") in the case of Hills v. 
United Parcel Service Inc> et ai, Civil No. 1:050407708 (Christiansen, J.) ("Hills IF). 
Defendants Liberty Mutual and Skyline Electric Co. filed motions joining in UPS's renewed 
motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs filed an opposition, and UPS filed a reply brief. UPS's renewed 
motion to dismiss was submitted for decision, and a hearing was held on March 31, 2008, at 
which counsel for UPS, Liberty Mutual, and Plaintiffs appeared and presented oral argument. 
Having considered UPS's renewed motion to dismiss, the opposition thereto, oral argument, and 
the record in this case, it is hereby: 
ORDERED that Skyline's Cross-Claims asserted against UPS in Hills //be, and hereby 
are, DISMISSED with prejudice. It is further 
ORDERED that Plaintiffs' First Claim for Relief—Negligence asserted in Hills //be, and 
hereby is, DISMISSED with prejudice. It is further 
ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Second Claim for Relief—Intentional Misconduct asserted in 
Hills //be, and hereby is, DISMISSED with prejudice to the extent such a claim seeks damages 
identified in Paragraphs 96(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), and (i) of Plaintiffs' Hills II Complaint 
and Demand for Jury Trial ("Hills //Complaint"). Plaintiffs can continue to seek from Skyline 
Electric Co. through the Hills /litigation the damages identified in Paragraphs 96 (a), (b), (c), 
(d), (e), (f), (g), and (i) of Plaintiffs' Hills II Complaint. Plaintiffs' Second Claim for Relief is not 
dismissed to the extent it seeks damages identified in Paragi'aphs 96(h), (j), (k)3 and (1). Pending 
supplemental briefing, the Court reserves its decision on whether the remaining aspects of 
Plaintiffs' Second Claim for Relief should be dismissed. It is further 
1 
ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Third Claim for Relief—Tortious Interference asserted in 
Hills II be, and hereby is DISMISSED with prejudice to the extent such a claim seeks damages 
identified in Paragraphs 96 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g)> and (i) of Plaintiffs' Hills II Complaint 
Plaintiffs can continue to seek from Skyline Electric Co. through the Hills I litigation the 
damages identified in Paragraphs 96 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), and (i) of Plaintiffs1 Hills II 
Complaint. Plaintiffs' Third Claim for Relief in Hills II is not dismissed to the extent it seeks 
damages identified in Paragraphs 96 (h), (j), (k), and (1), Pending supplemental briefing, the 
Court reserves its decision on whether the remaining aspects of Plaintiffs' Third Claim for Relief 
should be dismissed. It is further 
ORDERED that UPS, Liberty Mutual, and Plaintiffs shall submit supplemental briefing 
on whether, given Plaintiffs' Hills II Complaint and Skyline Electiic Co.'s admission of liability 
m Hills v. Skyline Electric Co., Civil No. 1:040107128 (Roth, J.), Plaintiffs Second and Third 
Claims for Relief remain viable such that Plaintiffs would be entitled to recover through the 
Hills II case the damages asserted in Paragraphs 96(h), (J), (k), and (1), UPS's and Liberty 
Mutual's respective supplemental opening briefs shall be due on or before May 1, 2008, limited 
to 10 pages. See Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(2). Plaintiffs' supplemental responsive brief shall be due 
on or before June 1, 2008, limited to 10 pages. Id UPS's and Liberty MutuaFs respective 
supplemental reply briefs shall be due on or before June 15,2008, limited to 5 pages. Id 
DATED this [Z day of <=I3UY\* 2008. 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
WEST JORDAN DIVISION 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 14th day of May, 2008,1 caused a true and correct copy of the 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT 
BRUCE HILLS AND JUDITH HILLS, 
individually, and as natural parents and heirs 
of MARK D. HILLS (deceased), 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE INC., an Ohio 
corporation; UPSCO UNITED PARCEL 
SERVICE CO., a Delaware corporation; 
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE INC., a Utah 
corporation; LIBERTY MUTUAL 
HOLDING COMPANY, INC., a 
Massachusetts Mutual Holding Company; 
LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Massachusetts Mutual 
Holding Company; and SKYLINE 
ELECTRIC COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS' 
RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case No. 050407708 
Judge Terry L. Christiansen 
-
This matter came before the Court on September 3,2008, for hearing on Defendants United 
Parcel Service Inc., UPSCO United Parcel Service Co., and United Parcel Service Inc., (collectively 
referred to as "UPS") Renewed Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs claims. Edward P. Moriarity and 
Bradley L. Booke, appeared on behalf of Plaintiffs, Jason Schwartz, Daniel Davis, Taggart Hansen 
and Ktra M. Slawson appeared on behalf of UPS, Dennis R. James appeared on behalf of Liberty 
Mutual Fire Insurance Company and Liberty Mutual Holding Company, Inc. (collectively referred 
to as "Liberty Mutual") and Gaiy L. Jolinson appeared on behalf of Skyline Electrical Company 
("Skyline"). Having considered the parties arguments, supplemental briefs, the applicable law, and 
the record in this case, the Court issues the following Memorandum Decision and Order: 
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiffs are the parents of a former UPS employee, Mark D. Hills, who died in an 
electrical accident while performing his work in August 2003. Plaintiffs filed Hills v. Skyline 
Electric Co., civil no. 040107125 (Roth, J.) ("Hills I") in October 2004, against Skyline alleging 
that its negligence caused the death of their son. 
While engaged in discovery in Hills /, Plaintiffs filed this law suit, known as Hills II, in 
September 2005, alleging that Defendants negligently and intentionally spoliated evidence in 
connection with the electrocution of Mark D. Hills and intentionally hindered the Hills I 
litigation. See Hills //Complaint dated August 16,2005, flf 32-55 and 69-94. Plaintiffs alleged 
Defendant's conduct proximately caused them damages and sought punitive damages, damages 
resulting from tortuous interference with a legal cause of action, damages resulting from 
hindrance with a lawful cause of action and any other damages.1 See id at % 96(h), (j), (k), and 
a). 
Skyline answered Plaintiffs complaint and filed cross claims against UPS. UPS and 
Liberty Mutual filed motions to dismiss both Plaintiffs complaint and Skyline's cross claims. 
The Court initially stayed ruling on UPS and Liberty Mutuals' motions to dismiss 
pending resolution of Hills /because (1) the discovery for Hills I and Hills //had been 
consolidated and would permit the parties to determine exactly what occurred that caused the 
1
 Other damages were also claimed, but these were dismissed pursuant to the Court's 
June 12, 2008 Order. 
2 
electrocution death of Mark D. Hills and what changes were made and by whom to the scene of 
the accident which constitute the "spoliation of evidence"claim; (2) the issue of whether Utah 
courts recognize the tort of "spoliation of evidence" has not been determined and (3) it is 
necessary for Hills I to be resolved to determine whether plaintiffs are unable to prove their case 
in Hills /before determining that such inability was due to "spoliated evience." 
After three years of discovery, Skyline amended their answer in Hills I to admit liability, 
but still dispute the damages alleged by Plaintiffs. Thereafter, UPS renewed its motion to 
dismiss in this case, Hills II and Liberty Mutual and Skyline joined in the motion. The Court 
granted UPS' Renewed Motion to Dismiss Skyline's cross claim and gi'anted in part and reserved 
in part UPS' Renewed Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint in an Order dated June 12,2008. 
Liberty Mutual and Skyline filed motions to join UPS' Renewed Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs 
filed an opposition and UPS filed a reply, which was joined by Liberty Mutual and Skyline. 
A hearing on the motion was held on March 31,2008, wherein Plaintiffs, UPS, Liberty 
Mutual and Skyline appeared and presented oral argument The Court ruled on a majority of the 
issues in an order dated June 12,2008. In that Order, the Court reserved decision on Plaintiffs' 
Second and Third Claims for Relief to the extent those claims sought damages identified in 
Paragraphs 96(h), (j)> (k), and (1). Plaintiffs' second claim for relief is intentional misconduct 
and the third claim for relief is tortuous interference. Both of these claims appear to be 
intentional spoliation of evidence claims and at the hearing sounded like abuse of process claims. 
The damages claims related to these claims for purposes of this motion are in Paragraph 96, 
subsections (h) Punitive damages; (j) Damages resulting from tortuous interference with a legal 
cause of action; (k) Damages resulting from hindrance with a lawful cause of action and (1) Any 
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damages provided by law, equity, or court ruling in accordance with the laws of the State of 
Utah. 
The Court requested supplemental briefs on whether, given Plaintiffs' Hills //Complaint 
and Skyline Electric Company's admission of liability in Hills I, Plaintiffs Second and Third 
Claims for Relief remain viable after Skyline's admission of liability in Hills I such that 
Plaintiffs would be entitled to recover through this case the damages asserted in Paragraphs 
96(h), (j)> (k), and (1). Plaintiffs, UPS, Liberty Mutual and Skyline have filed supplemental briefs 
on the issue. A hearing was held on September 3, 2008. 
SKYLINE ELECTRIC AND LIBERTY MUTUAL'S MOTIONS TO JOIN 
IN UPS' RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS 
Before addressing UPS' Renewed Motion to Dismiss, the Court will first address a matter 
raised by Liberty Mutual and Skyline. Apparently, there was some confusion on the application 
of the June 12,2008 Order to Skyline and Libeiiy Mutual. UPS' renewed motion to dismiss was 
filed by the UPS defendants. The other defendants, Liberty Mutual and Skyline, filed motions to 
join UPS' renewed motion to dismiss. Liberty Mutual is UPS' workman's compensation 
insurance carrier. Skyline is the electric company that performed the electrical work at UPS' 
work site where the death of Mr. Hills occurred. Plaintiffs did not oppose Liberty Mutual and 
Skyline's motions to join. To avoid misunderstanding and to clarify application of the June 12, 
2008 Order, the language of the Court's June 12, 2008 Order clearly reflect that Liberty Mutual 
and Skyline were included in that Order. 
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LAW 
A court may dismiss a case if the party fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 
granted. Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), A motion to dismiss under subdivision (b)(6) admits the facts 
alleged in the complaint, but challenges Plaintiffs right to relief based on those facts. St. 
Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp.t 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991). All reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from the facts should be made in a light most favorable to Plaintiff. 
Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764 (Utah 1991). A complaint is required to give the opposing party 
fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of 
litigation involved, or it is subject to dismissal under subdivision (b)(6). Utah Steel & Iron Co. v. 
Bosch, 475 P.2d 1019 (1970). 
I 
INTENTIONAL SPOLIATION CLAIMS 
Plaintiffs claim that although specific torts entitled "intentional misconduct" or "tortuous 
interference" do not exist in Utah, the substance of these claims constitute acts of intentional 
interference. Intentional interference is a tort that has been acknowledged by the Utah Supreme 
Court. Plaintiffs argue that although intentional interference is often associated with business 
relations, intentional interference within the context of harm to prospective economic relations 
creates the logical foundation for spoliation claims. Plaintiffs argue that the role and impact of 
UPS, Liberty Mutual and Skyline's (collectively referred to as "Defendants") intentional 
interference with evidence and the investigation pertaining to Mr. Hills' death in Hills /remains 
to be seen.2 hi Hills I9 Skyline still denies any damages. Plaintiffs argue that if they are unable to 
2
 The Court notes that at the March 31, 2008 hearing, Plaintiffs made arguments based 
upon facts and a new theory that were not in the Complaint and Demand for jury trial Plaintiffs 
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prove damages or damages are seriously impaired Plaintiffs' interference with a legal remedy 
claim remains viable. Plaintiffs argue that these proceedings have impacted Plaintiffs' 
expectancy in Hills I and Defendants cannot claim a legal "right" to inject such deceit into a 
lawsuit. 
As acknowledged by Plaintiffs, ""intentional misconduct" or "tortuous interference" 
claims do not exist in Utah. Plaintiffs argue that the Utah Supreme Court has recognized these 
torts as plead by Plaintiffs. The Court disagrees. While the tort of intentional interference with 
economic relations has been recognized by the Utah Supreme Court in Leigh Funiture and 
Carpet Co. V. horn, 657 P.2d 293, 301 (Utah 1982), it is a big leap to jump from economic 
relations to spoliation of evidence. Nevertheless, the label is unimportant, and the substance of 
argued that these facts were included in the Complaint, however, the Court disagrees. These 
additional facts relate to a long chain of legal events that ensued after Mr. Hills death. Plaintiffs 
argue that the issue of how Defendants' malfeasance resulted in a chain of unnecessary legal 
proceedings by increasing the costs of suit or, in that matter, even necessitating a full blown law 
suit is still an issue. 
From reviewing the facts in the Complaint and those additional facts in the briefs and 
even viewing those facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Court is not persuaded that 
Defendants did anything more than defend their respective interests and participate in the legal 
process. Wrongful death cases, by their very nature are cases that generally do not resolve 
quickly. Any claim for damages relating to a delay should be decided in the damages portion of 
Hills I, not here, an independent law suit for intentional spoliation. If Defendants had hindered 
or delayed for an improper purpose, this Court would expect to see motions to compel and 
motions for sanctions in Hills L However, no such motions have been filed in Hills L Moreover, 
Plaintiffs may have been premature in filing the present law suit because the litigation in Hills I 
had not concluded and there was no way to determine whether the acts of Defendants had 
affected the value of Plaintiffs claims in Hills L This case was stayed even before deciding a 
motion to dismiss in part because it was "necessary for Hills I to be resolved to determine 
whether plaintiffs are unable to prove their case in Hills /before determining that such inability 
was due to 'spoliated evience."' Nevertheless, these additional facts and new theory are 
improperly raised in response to a motion to dismiss a complaint that does not include them. 
Therefore, the Court refrains from making a ruling on these arguments. 
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the actions is what concerns this Court. Plaintiffs appear to be claiming an independent tort of 
intentional spoliation of evidence.3 
Spoliation can be traced back to an ancient Latin phrase: Contra Spoliatorem Omnia 
Praesumuntur, which literally means all things presumed against the destroyer. The concept of 
punishing those who interfere with the legal rights of another has been around in some form for 
centuries. Such punishment includes: the adverse inference jury instruction that declares the 
destruction of relevant evidence gives rise to an inference that the thing which has been destroyed 
or mutilated would have been unfavorable to the position of the party responsible for the 
spoliation; discovery sanctions that may include dismissal of a case; and statutory criminal 
prosecution. 
In 1984, the concept of spoliation of evidence as an independent tort was conceived. 
California was the first state to adopt spoliation as an independent cause of action in a first party 
case, Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 831 (Cal. Ct App. 1984). However, 
California has since retreated from its earlier decision to recognize spoliation as an independent 
tort, see Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511, 521 (Cal. 199S)(refusing 
to acknowledge an independent tort of intentional first-party spoliation and rejecting the Smith 
court's acceptance of the tort) and the Temple Community Hospital v. Superior Court, 976 P.2d 
223, 233 (Cal. \999){rejecting an independent tort of third party spoliation). 
3
 Defendants argue that the Court's dismissal of the negligent spoliation of evidence 
claim should result in the dismissal of these "identical claims." The Court disagrees that the 
claims are identical. There is a difference between a negligent and intentional tort. The state of 
mind for each is different, therefore, the dismissal of the negligent tort does not necessarily 
preclude the intentional tort. 
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Neither the intentional nor the negligent spoliation of evidence as an independent tort has 
been adopted in Utah.4 The single case substantively addressing an area of the spoliation of 
evidence doctrine by name is Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415,419 (UT App. 
1994). In Burns, a product liability case, the trial court granted summary judgment because 
Plaintiff could not show the bicycle at issue was defective. Plaintiff claimed that he could not 
provide proof because Defendant had destroyed the evidence of the defect and requested there be 
an evidentiary inference against Defendant that the bike was defective. The trial court refused 
Plaintiffs request. On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals stated; "While Burns cites no authority 
demonstrating that Utah has adopted the spoliation doctrine, we conclude that it would not apply 
to the facts of this case in any event." Id. The Court concluded that the requirements for 
establishing an evidentiary inference based on spoliation had not been met because Defendants 
were not and could not have been on notice of Burns contemplation to sue and there was no 
independent duty to retain the allegedly defective part. 
The limited area of the spoliation of evidence doctrine cited by the Burns Court applied to 
a negligent first party and the remedy sought was an evidentiary inference, hi this case, Plaintiffs 
filed an independent tort action for the intentional spoliation of the evidence against Defendants, 
first party Skyline and third parties UPS and Liberty Mutual, and the remedy sought is damages. 
For a doctrine that has not been adopted in Utah, this is a great leap from a negligent first party 
and the remedy of an adverse inference to an independent tort for intentional spoliation of the 
evidence and a remedy of damages. 
4
 The single Utah Supreme Court case citing the spoliation of evidence doctrine, State v. 
Seventy-Three Thousand One Hundred Thirty Dollars, 2001 UT 67, does no more than name the 
doctrine because the Court resolved the case on another ground for the appeal. 
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The spoliation of evidence doctrine has been discussed and sparingly applied in various 
forms throughout the United States.5 There appears to be a national debate on whether spoliation 
of the evidence should be an independent tort and if so, what acts should trigger the tort 
(negligent, intentional or both), what type of evidence should it extend to (limited to physical 
evidence or include all evidence), who should the tort extend to (first parties, third parties or 
both), and what should the remedy be (adverse inference, sanctions, dismissal, maximum 
damages, or a combination thereof).6 Surprisingly, Utah has not entered into the fray of this 
national debate. Since the spoliation of evidence doctrine has not been adopted in Utah in any 
form, this Court does not have a set rule or factors to apply to the parties to determine whether 
Plaintiffs fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 
General tort law requires a plaintiff to prove that a defendant proximately caused Plaintiff 
damages. To prove a defendant proximately caused Plaintiff damages in a spoliation of evidence 
claim Plaintiff must show that: "(1) plaintiff pursued the initial civil action, and was unsuccessful 
because of the absence of the destroyed evidence, or at the very least, that the destruction of the 
evidence in question made pursuing the initial claim impossible; and (2) that the destroyed 
5
 USLAW Network, Inc., USLAW Spoliation of Evidence Compendium (2005), 
http://uslawnetwork.org/files/public/SpoliationCompendium.pdfprovides a brief summary of 
the spoliation law in each of the states. 
6
 For additional information on the national debate relating to spoliation of evidence as 
an independent tort and the application of the doctrine there are various sources to refer. See 
Rachel L. Sykes, Comment, A Phantom Menace: Spoliation of Evidence in Idaho Civil Cases, 42 
Idaho L Rev. 821 (2006); Stefan Rubin, Note, Tort Reform: A Call for Florida to Scale Back its 
Independent Tort for the Spoliation of Evidence, 51 Fla. L. Rev. 345 (April 1999); Honorable 
Margaret O'Mara Frossard et al., Spoliation of Evidence in Illinois: The Law After Boyd v. 
Traveler's Insurance Co., 28 Loy. U. Chi. L.I 685 (Summer 1997); Ariel Porat et al., Liability 
for Uncertainty: Making Evidential Damage Actionable, 18 Cardozo L. Rev. 1891 (July 1997). 
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evidence would have enabled plaintiff successfully to pursue the initial civil action." Nix v. 
Hoke, 139 F. Supp. 2d 125 (D, D.C. 2001). Rather than try to predict whether the Utah Supreme 
Court would adopt the spoliation of evidence doctrine, and in what circumstances such doctrine 
would apply and what factors of the spoliation of evidence doctrine they would adopt, this Court 
will adopt and apply the foregoing two factor analysis in making its decision. 
UPS and Liberty Mutual are third party defendants in the context of Plaintiffs' intentional 
spoliation of evidence claim. Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, they were 
having difficulty proving that Skyline's wrongful acts caused Mr. Hills death because of UPS and 
Liberty Mutual*s acts. Even viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, Skyline's 
recent admission of liability in Hills /clearly establishes that Plaintiffs are successful in the 
proving liability in Hills L Plaintiffs seek "punitive damages," "damages resulting from tortuous 
interference with a legal cause of action," "damages resulting from hindrance with a lawful cause 
of action" and "any damages provided by law, equity, or court ruling in accordance with the laws 
of the state of Utah." Any spoliation of evidence by UPS and Liberty Mutual relates to proving 
liability, not damages. Because liability is no longer an issue in Hills I, Plaintiffs' legal remedy 
is not affected by UPS and Liberty Mutual's actions. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs 
intentional spoliation of evidence claim fails because Plaintiffs cannot show damages caused by 
UPS and Liberty MutuaPs acts. 
As to Plaintiffs argument that their claim against UPS and Liberty Mutual is viable until 
after the damages are determined in Hills I, the Court disagrees. Mr. Hill's death is not disputed. 
Plaintiffs damages for Mr. Hill's wrongful death were fixed at the moment of Mr. Hill's death. 
Nothing the Defendants' did after Mr. Hill's death could affect the value of Plaintiffs damages 
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for his wrongful death. Plaintiffs argue that Defendants actions affected Plaintiffs probable 
expectancy in damages, a valuable property right. Defendants could not alter Plaintiffs probable 
expectancy in damages. Evidence of damages were frozen at the time of Mr. Hill's death. 
Whatever damages Plaintiffs are entitled to receive for Mr. Hill's wrongful death will be 
determined in the Hills I case between Plaintiffs and Skyline. All viable damage claims will be 
made available to Plaintiffs in Hills L 
Plaintiffs argue the delay created by UPS and Liberty MutuaPs acts diminished the value 
of the their claim in Hills I. Plaintiffs fail to present any case or statutory law that "mere delay 
witlaout other injury is actionable" for intentional spoliation of evidence. If there was a showing 
that Plaintiffs' claims against Skyline were barred by the statute of limitations or Skyline's 
insurer was insolvent, then there may be actionable injury. However, Plaintiffs fail to show that 
there is anything more than mere delay.7 Plaintiffs are not prevented from recovering the foil 
extent of their damages that they can prove in Hills L 
Although Skyline is a first party to the underlying suit relating to Mr. Hills wrongful 
death, Hills /, the same reasoning that applies to UPS and Liberty Mutual applies to Skyline with 
regard to the intentional spoliation of evidence claim and the remaining damages. Whatever 
damages Plaintiffs are entitled to from Skyline will be determined in Hills L Plaintiffs should 
not have a second bite of the apple against Skyline in continuing Hills //where the issue of 
damages will be conclusively decided between them in Hills I 
Plaintiffs argue that punitive damages are claimed here against all of Defendants whereas 
Hills I captures only one defendant, Skyline. Plaintiffs argue that all Defendants should be 
7
 See supra n.2. 
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subject to punitive damages for their actions. Although the Court understands that there are more 
parties and deeper pockets with three Defendants in the case at bar, rather than just one in Hills /, 
Plaintiffs* desire for punitive damages is an inadequate basis to allow punitive damages to stand 
alone. There must be a viable cause of action attached to Plaintiffs' punitive damages claim. As 
decided above, Plaintiffs intentional spoliation claim fails, thus there is no meritorious cause of 
action to justify a punitive damage award. 
Plaintiffs argue that if punitive damages are not allowed as a remedy for Defendants 
actions they will escape punishment and there is nothing to deter such action in the future. What 
was done by Defendants in altering or destroying evidence is not condoned by this Court. The 
law specifically provides sanctions where such actions occur. There was a punishment for UPS' 
actions, a fine was imposed by Utah Occupational Safety and Health (<4UOSH"), which is the 
state entity that investigates accidents at work sites. UOSH has investigated both the death and 
subsequent actions of UPS. As a result of their investigation, UOSH imposed a fine against 
UPS, the amount of which is beyond this Court's purview. Although Plaintiffs would like a 
private right of action to be created with UPS' duty to preserve an accident work site for UOSH 
and a claim for punitive damages, Plaintiffs fail to cite a legal basis to do so. 
There are other sanctions in place to prevent tampering with evidence. If a company or 
employee choose to tamper with evidence, they are subject to criminal charges and 
administrative penalties. Individuals that destroy evidence are subject to criminal charges for 
Tampering with Evidence in Noncriminal Official Proceedings, Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510,5, a 
class A misdemeanor, and if committed in an official proceeding, a third degree felony. If an 
employee of UPS, Liberty Mutual or Skyline knowingly or intentionally altered, destroyed, 
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concealed or removed anything with the purpose of impairing the veracity or viability of the 
thing in a proceeding or investigation that the person Icnew was pending or about to be instituted 
or with the intent to prevent an investigation or proceeding, then the person can be prosecuted. 
For a third degree felony conviction, the penalty could include imprisonment in a state prison for 
a term not to exceed five years and a fine not to exceed $5,000 plus an 85% surcharge. For a 
class A misdemeanor conviction, the penalty could include imprisonment in jail for a term not to 
exceed one year and a fine not to exceed $2,500 plus an 85% surcharge. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-
3-203,-204,-301. 
UPS, Liberty Mutual and/or Skyline could also be held criminally responsible for the 
actions of an employee that tampered with evidence pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-204. 
The fines for a felony conviction against one of them shall not exceed $20,000 plus an 85% 
surcharge and for a class A misdemeanor conviction shall not exceed $10,000 plus an 85% 
surcharge. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-302. Additional sanctions could include advertising of 
conviction and/or disqualification of officer(s). Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-303. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court concludes that with Skyline's admission to liability 
in Hills /, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Therefore, the Court 
GRANTS the Renewed Motion to Dismiss the second and third causes of action and the 
remaining damages claims in favor of UPS, Liberty Mutual and Skyline. 
***** Intentionally left blank ***** 
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II 
ALTERNATIVE BASIS TO DISMISS UPS 
WORKER'S COMPENSATION ACT EXCLUSIVE REMEDY 
UPS alleges that Plaintiffs' admission that their Hills //negligence claim against UPS is 
barred by the Utah's Worker's Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann, § 34A-2-101 etseq, (the Act) 
is fatal to Plaintiffs' remaining claims of intentional misconduct and tortious interference because 
the type of act necessary to overcome the Act's exclusivity provisions are not present. Plaintiffs 
respond that the Act's exclusive remedy does not bar Plaintiffs' claims of intentional misconduct 
and tortuous interference because this case implicates the dual capacity doctrine. Plaintiffs argue 
that the Act only bars suit against employers for injuries arising out of the course of employment. 
They argue that their injuries relative to these causes of action arose solely out of acts or 
omissions that took place after their son's death - matters distinct from on the job injury. 
Plaintiffs argue that after Mr. Hills died, UPS could not be acting in its capacity as Mr. Hills 
employer. Plaintiffs further argue that UPS was acting outside the scope of its employer-
employee relationship with Mark Hills when UPS intentionally altered evidence, lost or 
destroyed evidence and UPS employees lied to Utah OSHA investigators, and UPS generally 
engaged in a cover up of the cause of Mark Hills' death. 
The Worker's Compensation Act "makes it clear that the intent of the legislature is to 
provide an exclusive remedy for job related injuries." Hunsaker v. State of Utah 870 P.2d at 899. 
"The dual capacity doctrine directly conflicts with the exclusive remedy provision of [the Act]." 
Id. The dual capacity doctrine is an exception to the exclusive-remedy provision of the Act that 
has not been adopted in Utah, but the doctrine's existence has been acknowledged in three Utah 
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cases, Bingham v. Lagoon Corporation, 707 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah 1985), Stewart v. CMI 
Corporation, 740 P.2d 1340 (Utah 1987); and Hunsaker v. State of Utah, 870 P.2d 893 (Utah 
1993). "Under this doctrine, an employer normally shielded from tort liability by the exclusive 
remedy principle may become liable in tort to his own employee if he occupies, in addition to his 
capacity as employer, a second capacity that confers on his obligations independent of those 
imposed on him as an employer." Bingham v. Lagoon Corp., 707 P.2d at 680. 
The decisive test to determine if the dual capacity doctrine is invokable is not 
whether the second function or capacity of the employer is different and separate 
from the first. Rather, the test is whether the employer's conduct in the second 
role or capacity has generated obligations that are unrelated to those flowing from 
the company's or individual's first role as an employer. If the obligations are 
related, the doctrine is not applicable. Id. 
UPS5 conduct that is the basis of Plaintiffs "intentional misconduct" and "tortuous 
interference" causes of action relate to UPS' activities after Mr. Hills death. These activities 
include: conducting their own investigation of the accident site prior to notifying OSHA or law 
enforcement; contacting and working in concert with the co-defendants; removal, alteration of 
equipment, material, or other evidence; failure to disclose, misrepresent and/or conceal their 
actions to OSHA, and other like allegations. Even viewing the facts in a light most favorable to 
Plaintiff, UPS' conduct in its role with OSHA and the co-defendants did not generate obligations 
that are unrelated to UPS' obligations flowing from its first role as an employer. Therefore, even 
assuming the Utah Supreme Court would adopt the dual capacity doctrine, the Court concludes 
that in this case, the dual capacity doctrine cannot be invoked to overcome the exclusive remedy 
shield of the Act as it applies to UPS. As an alternative basis to dismiss UPS, the Court 
concludes that the exclusive remedy provision of the Act shields UPS from liability. 
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ORDER 
The Court hereby ORDERS: 
UPS' Renewed Motion to Dismiss GRANTED on the second and third causes of action and 
the damages claims asserted in Paragraphs 96(h), (j), (k), and (1), therefore, UPS, Liberty Mutual and 
Skyline are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice. 
DATED this ^ _ day of September, 2008. ^•t fWs&c. . . 
2ST37t?^ 
The Honorable TERRYj v. ins nonoraoie 1 £,KKI$L,. K^p^y±^^Q^ 
^<DiirdJPlstrict Court Judge ^ ••''" -::' V J # 
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Exhibit 5 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
Bruce Hills and Judith 
Hills, individually, and as 
natural" parents and heirs 
of Mark D. Hills (deceased), 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. Case No. 20080826-SC 
United Parcel Service, Inc.; 
UPSCO United Parcel Service Co.; 
Liberty Mutual Holding Company, 
Inc.; Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance 
Company; and Skyline Electric Company, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
ORDER 
This Court has elected to retain the above-entitled appeal on its 
docket. The prior order of transfer to the Court of Appeals is 
vacated; however, the Court retains its discretion to transfer 
the appeal at a later time if circumstances warrant. Unless 
otherwise notified, the parties shall file all future pleadings 
in the Supreme Court• 
FOR THE COURT: 
'- 3 ( ~ ^ 
Date Matthew B. Durrant 
Associate Chief Justice 
